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Deracialization and Democracy 
Steven A. Ramirez† & Neil G. Williams†† 
Abstract 
The United States suffers the continued costs of maintaining a 
racial hierarchy. Enhanced diversity and growing realization of the 
economic costs of that hierarchy could lead to democratic pressure for 
reform. Yet, in the U.S., elites on the radical right seek to entrench 
themselves in power through the constriction of voting power and the 
strategic use of the racial hierarchy as a political tool. This Article 
traces the anti-democratic efforts of the radical right to limit the 
political power of the nation’s enhanced diversity, and to utilize archaic 
governance measures to entrench themselves politically, regardless of 
the costs of allowing the racial hierarchy to continue to fester. Anti-
democratic efforts to limit voting power to assure non-democratic 
governance and outcomes recently scored significant success as 
recounted in this Article. The anti-democratic contrivances to limit the 
power of enhanced diversity requires comparable countermeasures to 
vindicate the core value of expanded democracy that find its roots in 
our history and in the Constitution’s trajectory towards ever greater 
democratic governance. This Article surveys countermeasures that 
could lead to the preservation and even expansion of democratic 
governance. It concludes that only through a renewed pursuit of 
expansive voting rights can we restore our democracy and move the 
nation away from its racist past. 
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Introduction 
Some notable scholars maintain that the United States’ racial 
hierarchy will endure permanently.1 Others maintain that appropriate 
legal frameworks can diminish the influence of racial hierarchies, at least 
to the extent that human capital is broadly developed2 and the rule of 
law3 operates free of racial discrimination.4 Attitudes may operate 
beyond the law, at least over the short and medium term, but law can 
operate free of discrimination, and if all human capital develops to its 
maximum potential, then perhaps law sets the stage for continual 
 
1. E.g., Derrick Bell, Faces at the Bottom of the Well 92 (1992); 
see also id. at ix (“[R]acism is an integral, permanent, and indestructible 
component of this society.”); Derrick Bell, Law as a Religion, 69 Case 
W. Res. L. Rev. 265, 265 (2018) (“[W]e know from history and experience 
that law will never deliver justice and that law in America will never 
deliver racial justice; yet, we are called upon to believe somehow justice 
is just around the corner.”). 
2. World Bank Group, The Human Capital Project 32 (2018) 
(scoring the U.S.’s next generation of workers at 76% of potential in terms 
of human capital development and Singapore’s at 88%, notwithstanding 
high ethnic diversity), available at https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/ 
 bitstream/handle/10986/30498/33252.pdf?sequence=5&isAllowed=y [https: 
 //perma.cc/2SAK-3EHJ]. 
3. The U.S. rates poorly today on the rule of law insofar as racial 
discrimination is concerned. See World Justice Project, Rule of 
Law Index 2017–2018, at 153 (2018) (ranking the U.S. a modest 19 out 
of 113 nations in adherence to the rule of law and scoring the U.S. 
especially weak on absence of discrimination in its criminal and civil 
justice systems), available at https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/ 
 files/documents/WJP-ROLI-2018-June-Online-Edition_0.pdf [https:// 
 perma.cc/G2E5-PCSN]. Other nations beset by a history of racial divisions, 
such as Singapore, score much higher than the U.S. on absence of discrim–
ination under law. Id. at 134. 
4. Continued racial (or irrational) discrimination against a substantial part 
of any given population will result in a compromised rule of law, as well 
as impaired human development, which will negatively impact society as 
a whole through constricted macroeconomic performance and stunted 
human development. See Steven A. Ramirez & Neil G. Williams, On the 
Permanence of Racial Injustice and the Possibility of Deracialization, 69 
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 299, 322–24 (2018). The internationally renowned 
consultancy firm of McKinsey & Company found that U.S. GDP in 2008 
was $525 billion lower than it would be if there were no education gap 
between whites and minorities. Byron G. Auguste et al., The Economic 
Cost of the US Education Gap, McKinsey & Company: Social Sector 
(June 2009), http://www.mckinsey.com/industries/social-sector/our-insights/ 
 the-economic-cost-of-the-us-education-gap [https://perma.cc/J967-RBSC]. 
See also Steven A. Ramirez, What We Teach About When We Teach 
About Race: The Problem of Law and Pseudo-Economics, 54 J. Leg. 
Educ. 365, 375 (2004) (estimating that the macroeconomic costs of race 
to approach $1 trillion per year). 
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progress in terms of eliminating racial privileges and hierarchies.5 This 
more sanguine view of the possibility of deracialization, however, 
assumes that demographic and economic pressures find expression 
through a rationalized system of democratic decision-making that 
reflects the needs and desires of the entire population.6 But in the U.S. 
today, democracy and majority rule prove elusive.7 
In terms of economics, the U.S. faces an enormous challenge that 
promises to steadily worsen: the corrosive influence of a socially 
constructed racial hierarchy that leaves millions of young Americans 
stranded at the margins of our economy and deprives our economy of 
a rationalized human-capital-formation function.8 Our legal and educa–
tional system propagates and entrenches this irrational economic 
reality, and the legal academy plays a central role in this deeply 
 
5. Ramirez & Williams, supra note 4, at 338 (“[T]he staggering economic 
costs of the Court’s reactionary position on our racial hierarchy, combined 
with demographic realities, suggest the Court’s approach is both economically 
and politically unsustainable.”); see also id. at 307–24 (detailing the operation 
and the costs of the U.S.’s racial hierarchy). 
6. Most Americans rate our democracy “weak,” and over two-thirds find it 
“weakening.” George W. Bush Institute et al., The Democracy 
Project 4-5 (2018) [hereinafter Democracy Project], available at 
https://www.democracyprojectreport.org/sites/default/files/2018-06/FINAL 
 _POLL_REPORT_Democracy_Project_2018_v5.pdf [https://perma. 
 cc/ST4V-NSP9]. The Economist Intelligence Unit ranks democratic 
governance across the world in terms of the degree to which the will of 
the people governs and it finds that the U.S. system rates as a “flawed 
democracy” that has substantially declined since 2006. The Economist 
Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index 2018: Me too? Political 
Participation, Protest and Democracy 10, 41 (2018) [hereinafter EIU 
Democracy Index]. 
7. American Democracy’s Built-in Bias towards Rural Republicans, 
Economist, (July 12, 2018), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2018/07/ 
 12/american-democracys-built-in-bias-towards-rural-republicans [https:// 
 perma.cc/VE4R-XG9E] (“America . . . is plagued by the only democratic 
vice more troubling than the tyranny of the majority: tyranny of the 
minority.”); Timothy Egan, Our Fake Democracy, N.Y. Times (June 23, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/23/opinion/our-fake-democracy 
 .html [https://perma.cc/6ESE-T8L3] (“For the United States, the biggest 
institutional lie of the moment is that we have a government of the people, 
responding to majority will.”). 
8. Human ingenuity drives all innovation, which in turn drives sustainable 
macroeconomic growth. See Steven A. Ramirez, Lawless Capitalism 
137 (2013). As such, the nation that maximizes the capacity of its human 
resources will invariably out-innovate and out-grow nations that allow 
human resources to wallow in economically oppressive conditions. See id. 
at 20. In the U.S. today, about 40% of African-American children and 
35% of Latino children suffer from poverty-driven opportunity losses. See 
id. at 135. 
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suboptimal economic outcome9 by failing to teach both the role of the 
Supreme Court’s emphasis on using the Equal Protection Clause to 
protect only those at the top of economic and social hierarchies and the 
importance of the core value of democracy.10 Our entire society bears 
the cost of this economic challenge in the form of trillions of dollars in 
foregone macroeconomic growth.11 In addition, our entire society suffers 
 
9. For example, recent criminal allegations of fraud in connection with 
college admissions, whereby wealthy whites bought their way into high 
status universities, spotlighted again all the legal ways the Supreme Court 
allows affirmative action programs that largely benefit wealthy whites. 
See Clare Lombardo, How Admissions Really Work: If The College 
Admissions Scandal Shocked You, Read This, NPR, (Mar. 23, 2019, 9:15 
AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/03/23/705183942/how-admissions-really- 
 work-if-the-college-admissions-scandal-shocked-you-read-th [https://perma. 
 cc/B8WM-ZPES] (“There are lots of ways that wealthy families get a 
boost in the college admissions process. Most are quite legal.”); How to 
De-Corrupt College Admissions, Christian Sci. Monitor, (Mar. 19, 
2019), https://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/the-monitors-view/2019/ 
 0313/How-to-de-corrupt-college-admissions [https://perma.cc/8GRN-2PG9] 
(“[T]he FBI announced 50 indictments related to fraud and bribery in the 
admissions process of several elite universities. More indictments are 
expected.”); Poison Ivy, Economist, (Sept. 21, 2006), https://www. 
 economist.com/united-states/2006/09/21/poison-ivy [https://perma.cc/ 
 RBK3-87H3] (“No less than 60% of the places in elite universities are 
given to candidates who have some sort of extra ‘hook’, from rich or 
alumni parents to ‘sporting prowess.’ The number of whites who benefit 
from this affirmative action is far greater than the number of blacks.”). 
10. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Case Against the Supreme Court 293–
94 (2014) (concluding that, institutionally, the Court operates to protect 
the interests of dominant political and economic elites, rather than 
protecting minorities, individual rights, or long-term values); see also 
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (expanding 
the power of corporations’ electioneering abilities and thereby empowering 
the CEOs of such corporations); Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 
U.S. 77, 90 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting) (“Yet, of the cases in this Court 
in which the Fourteenth Amendment was applied during the first fifty 
years after its adoption, less than one-half of one per cent. invoked it in 
protection of [African Americans], and more than fifty per cent. asked 
that its benefits be extended to corporations.”). One commentator calls 
the Supreme Court “one of the most powerful and most malign 
institutions in American history.” Ian Millhiser, Injustices, at x 
(2016). The injustices perpetrated by the Court that Millhiser highlights 
include the use of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect the powerful 
instead of the most vulnerable, empowering billionaires to “corrupt 
American democracy,” and neutering voting-rights protections for minorities. 
Id. at xii–xiii. Essentially, Millhiser argues that the Supreme Court 
embraces “extra-constitutional limits on the government’s ability to 
protect the most vulnerable Americans, while simultaneously refusing to 
enforce rights that are explicitly enshrined in the Constitution’s text.” Id. 
at xiii. 
11. Impaired macroeconomic growth means we all sell goods and services into 
a smaller market with less demand. Ramirez, supra note 8, at 28–29. The 
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the effects of stunted human-capital development and innovation.12 Law 
frames and promotes this outcome on a systemic basis, with the 
Supreme Court non-democratically paving the way towards macro–
economic backwardness.13 
In terms of demographics, we believe that new demographic and 
economic realities will create opportunities for the kinds of initiatives 
needed to diminish the perpetuation of our racial hierarchy—
specifically, the broadest possible embrace of cultural diversity under 
the law and the broadest human development. Demographically, people 
of color will constitute a majority of the U.S. population by 2045.14 
“New census population projections confirm the importance of racial 
minorities as the primary demographic engine of the nation’s future 
growth, countering an aging, slow-growing and soon to be declining 
white population.”15 Specifically, in 2045 the nation is projected to be 
49.7% white, 24.6% Hispanic, 13.1% African American, 7.9% Asian 
American, and 3.8% multiracial populations.16 This will create impor–
tant economic and social changes across society. 
 
United Nations publishes the Inequality-adjusted Human Development 
Index (“IHDI”) that tests the degree to which law and institutions serve 
a given society in terms of life expectancy, education, and standard of 
living. United Nations Development Programme, Human Devel–
opment Indicators and Indices: 2018 Statistical Update 1–13 (2018), 
available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-indices- 
 indicators-2018-statistical-update [https://perma.cc/XD9Z-CZWK]. The 
U.S. ranks modestly on this measure of well-being at thirteenth, id. at 22; 
Singapore ranks ninth while maintaining a much higher per-capita income 
(more than 50%) advantage over the U.S. Id. at 30. 
12. Impaired human-capital formation leads to lower innovation, lower 
consumption, and, thus, less growth. See Ramirez, supra note 8, at 22–
23. 
13. Steven A. Ramirez, Foreword: Diversity in the Legal Academy After 
Fisher II, 51 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 979, 985 & n.36 (2018) (citing George 
Mace, The Antidemocratic Nature of Judicial Review, 60 Calif. L. Rev. 
1140, 1149 (1972) (“Since to resist a majority the judiciary must be 
independent of that majority, the character of judicial review is properly 
antidemocratic.”)). 
14. William H. Frey, The US Will Become ‘Minority White’ in 2045, Census 
Projects, Brookings: The Avenue (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.brookings. 
 edu/blog/the-avenue/2018/03/14/the-us-will-become-minority-white-in-
2045-census-projects/ [https://perma.cc/2L62-S2ZG]. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. Current projections illustrate a contrast between the youth minority 
population and the aging white population: 
Minorities will be the source of all of the growth in the nation’s 
youth and working age population, most of the growth in its 
voters, and much of the growth in its consumers and tax base as 
far into the future as we can see. Hence, the more rapidly growing, 
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While this will create political pressure for racial reform, America’s 
representative democracy faces severe distortions as a result of the 
arcane and archaic legal frameworks associated with the preservation 
of slavery and the enduring reality of racism in America.17 Thus, for 
example, with respect to the Electoral College, Professor Juan Perea 
reviewed the pro-slavery structure of the Constitution18 and quotes 
James Madison for the proposition that the founders needed to address 
the problem of maintaining slavery in light of superior popular voting 
power in the North.19 The solution was the Electoral College, which, 
along with the infamous “three-fifths of all other persons” rule, ensured 
that the South could maintain slavery for decades.20 Most recently, this 
meant that Hillary Clinton lost the 2016 election despite the fact that 
she garnered over three million votes more than Donald Trump in the 
final certified election results.21 The U.S. Senate operates as a racial 
 
largely white senior population will be increasingly dependent on 
their contributions to the economy and to government programs 
such as Medicare and Social Security. This suggests the necessity 
for continued investments in the nation’s diverse youth and young 
adults as the population continues to age. 
 Id. 
17. This Article envisions a democratic republic cabined within traditional 
constitutional limitations, but free of the distortions of our racial history 
and faithful to the Amendments expanding voting rights. See, e.g., 
Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 
Colum. L. Rev. 531, 565 (1998) (“Indications from the time surrounding 
the drafting and ratification of the Constitution suggest that . . . the view 
of accountability that the founding community held . . . is a view of 
accountability as a notion of blame.”); Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of 
Direct Democracy, 99 Yale L.J. 1503, 1521 (1990) (“If the Constitution’s 
Framers were keen on majority rule, they certainly had a bizarre manner 
of demonstrating their affection.”). Consequently, this Article seeks 
constrained democracy with limited majority rule and universal suffrage. 
18. E.g., Juan F. Perea, Echoes of Slavery II: How Slavery’s Legacy Distorts 
Democracy, 51 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1081, 1083 (2018) [hereinafter Perea, 
Echoes] (“One of the proslavery features of the Constitution is the electoral 
college, enacted as a way to protect the interests of slave owners.”); see also 
Juan F. Perea, Race and Constitutional Law Casebooks: Recognizing the 
Proslavery Constitution, 110 Mich. L. Rev. 1123, 1148 (2012) [hereinafter 
Perea, Proslavery] (“If we ignore the evidence of a proslavery Constitution, 
we are not likely to inquire into the important present ramifications of 
the proslavery Constitution.”). 
19. Perea, Echoes, supra note 18, at 1088 (illustrating that Madison was 
aware that the “right of suffrage was much more diffusive in the Northern 
than the Southern States”). 
20. See id. at 1083–88. 
21. See Gregory Krieg, It’s Official: Clinton Swamps Trump in Popular Vote, 
CNN (Dec. 22, 2016, 5:34 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2016/12/21/politics/ 
 donald-trump-hillary-clinton-popular-vote-final-count/index.html [https:// 
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gerrymander that today preserves white, male power.22 Certainly, the 
law channels and defines the impact of political pressure.23 This Article 
will show that the law today defines the U.S. political system in a 
fundamentally non-democratic, pro-oligarchy way that too often nega–
tes and neutralizes pressure for racial justice.24 
The Founding Fathers originally intended to impose an oligarchy 
upon our nation with very limited democratic influence.25 Aside from 
 
 perma.cc/HM93-W3PA]. 
22. See Terry Smith, Reinventing Black Politics: Senate Districts, Minority 
Vote Dilution and the Preservation of the Second Reconstruction, 25 
Hastings Const. L.Q. 277, 354 (1998). The constitutional debates 
regarding the Senate were intimately bound to the issue of slavery. See 
Jill Lepore, These Truths: A History of the United States 122–
25 (2018). 
23. Keith E. Whittington et al., The Study of Law and Politics, in The 
Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics 3 (Keith E. Whittington et 
al. eds., 2008) (“[L]aw is not only the product of politics but also constitutive 
of politics.”). 
24. The threat of oligarchic rule and its costs first emerged with respect to 
the Great Financial Crisis of 2008: 
The Great Recession has awakened us to something new in the 
nation’s social and economic development. Inequality has been 
rising for decades, but recent shocks have laid bare what this 
means for our social structure: a shrinking middle class and an 
increasingly entrenched wealthy elite. Americans remain profo–
undly attached to an idea of America as a middle-class nation, 
with very few of us on the economic margins, abundant oppor–
tunities to raise oneself or one’s offspring into the middle classes, 
and everyone enjoying a fair shot at wealth and success. In fact 
we are becoming the opposite. The number of Americans facing 
real poverty is growing; opportunities for middle-class livelihoods 
are shrinking; and economic clout is becoming concentrated at the 
top to a degree that recalls the last Gilded Age. As structures of 
opportunity have grown increasingly narrow and brittle, and class 
differences have widened, the nation is becoming what reformers 
throughout the nineteenth and early-twentieth century meant 
when they talked about a society with a “moneyed aristocracy” 
or a “ruling class”—an oligarchy, not a republic. 
 Joseph Fishkin & William E. Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution, 
94 B.U. L. Rev. 669, 672 (2014) (citation omitted). 
25. “By 1787 and the adoption of the U.S. Constitution, there were still no 
federal laws regarding who could vote. The decision fell to states with 
many maintaining the standard that favored white men of property, 
wealth, and education. By George Washington’s election in 1789, only 6 
percent of the population was permitted to vote.” Tom Huskerson, A Brief 
History of Voter Registration in the United States, IVN: Archives (Dec, 
13 2013), https://ivn.us/2013/12/13/independent-voter-network-ivn/ 
[https://perma.cc/4RKE-DMQR]. Of course, under the original Constitution 
only the House of Representatives faced direct elections at all; the 
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the distortions implicit in the U.S. Senate, the Electoral College, and 
the inflation of Southern voting power through the three-fifths rule, the 
Founders operated in full view of state laws that extended franchise 
rights primarily to white, Protestant, male land owners—or about six 
percent of the population.26 The original intent of the Founders sought, 
at best, to impose a highly constrained democratic republic with extr–
emely limited suffrage, and, at worst, to constitute a government with 
only a bare semblance of democracy.27 Americans hold democracy as a 
core value, but the legally constructed political system in place today 
is archaic and yields a perverse form of minority, not majority, rule.28 
 
Electoral College selected the President, and state legislatures selected 
Senators. U.S. Const. art. I, § 3; id. art. II, § 1. Arguably, the original 
Constitution enshrined a “slavocracy” alongside an oligarchy. See 
Lepore, supra note 22, at 125 (“The most remarkable consequence of this 
remarkable arrangement was to grant slave states far greater 
representation in Congress than free states.”). Certain delegates bolted 
the convention or spoke passionately against this outcome while others 
noted with shame the intent of the Constitution’s basic structure. See id. 
at 126–127 (noting that Martin Luther, Gouverneur Morris and John 
Dickinson all voiced their opposition to slavery’s preservation in the 
Constitution). 
26. Grace Panetta & Olivia Reaney, The Evolution of American Voting Rights 
in 242 Years Shows How Far We’ve Come—and How Far We Still Have to 
Go, Bus. Insider (Feb. 15, 2019, 9:25 AM), https://www.businessinsider. 
 com/when-women-got-the-right-to-vote-american-voting-rights-timeline-
2018-10 [https://perma.cc/HUD2-D7QY]. Many delegates thought the 
states granted an “excess of democracy.” Lepore, supra note 22, at 121. 
27. At the beginning of the Republic, voting generally did not even include 
the right to a secret ballot, which invited intimidation and even violence. 
Jill Lepore, Rock, Paper, Scissors: How We Used to Vote, New Yorker 
(Oct. 6, 2008), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2008/10/13/rock-
paper-scissors [https://perma.cc/5BAF-J3HF]. 
28. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Can American Democracy Come Back?, Boston Globe 
(Nov. 7, 2018, 10:49 PM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2018/11/ 
 06/can-american-democracy-come-back/vzXt3DUbCeuWitpirTWCOJ/story. 
 html [https://perma.cc/9WB6-C7JH] (“The minority is dominating the 
majority . . . . A majority of Americans want gun control, an increase in 
the minimum wage, guaranteed access to health insurance, and better 
regulation of the banks that brought on the 2008 crisis. Yet all of these 
goals seem unattainable.”). Stiglitz, a Nobel Prize-winning economist, also 
places democracy, race, and economics in a context similar to this Article: 
[T]he Republican Party’s reliance on voter suppression, gerry–
mandering, and similar efforts at electoral manipulation have also 
contributed to ensuring that the will of the majority is thwarted. 
The party’s approach is perhaps understandable: After all, shift–
ing demographics have put the Republicans at an electoral disad–
vantage. A majority of Americans will soon be nonwhite, and a 
21st-century world and economy cannot be reconciled with a 
male-dominated society. And the urban areas where the majority 
of Americans live, whether in the North or the South, have learned 
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This Article addresses the question of whether democracy in the 
U.S. will express the rising demographic and economic pressure for 
change or whether law can distort democratic processes and neutralize 
the rising political pressure for dismantling America’s festering racial 
hierarchy.29 Part II traces recent race-based attacks on U.S. democracy 
designed to shift power to small bands of entrenched elites. Part II 
strives to assess the viability of such attacks to foil future economic and 
demographic pressure for reform. Part III highlights the Supreme 
Court’s role in the effort to restore the eighteenth-century oligarchy the 
Founders envisioned. Part IV summarizes historic and political devel–
opments that suggest that in the U.S., democracy remains a powerful 
core value that will ultimately triumph over attacks on democracy from 
the far right. Part V assesses the lawfulness of putative legal changes 
that aim to save our representative democracy and end minority rule. 
The search for solutions for the vindication of this core democratic 
value, notwithstanding the archaic law framing democracy in America 
and the far-right’s race-based attacks on democracy, teaches that the 
U.S. should use all means necessary under the law to restore democracy 
so it can restore the rule of law. 
This Article concludes that law can secure an enhanced democracy 
and thwart efforts to return America to an oligarchy. Instead, law will 
shed the archaic and race-based remnants in the Constitution that 
 
the value of diversity. Voters in these areas of growth and dynamism 
have also seen the role that government can and must play to 
bring about shared prosperity. They have abandoned the 
shibboleths of the past, sometimes almost overnight. In a democratic 
society, therefore, the only way a minority—whether it’s large 
corporations trying to exploit workers and consumers, banks 
trying to exploit borrowers, or those mired in the past trying to 
recreate a bygone world—can retain their economic and political 
dominance is by undermining democracy itself. 
 Id. 
29. Closely related to the racial hierarchy plaguing the U.S. is the emergence 
of white-identity politics, in which white voters vote in ways both closely 
aligned to notions of white interests and hostile to the perceived interests 
of minorities: 
One of the primary lessons of our current moment is that race 
continues to inform our political and social relations in complex 
and often poignant ways. In the current state of election law 
doctrines, that complexity is lost. A presumption of good faith is 
afforded to political actors, even when unjustified based on past 
and present behavior. Politics and race relations are segregated in 
judicial doctrines, despite their increased coalescence. These racial 
blind spots are an accomplice to the perpetuation of white identity 
politics. 
 Joshua S. Sellers, Election Law and White Identity Politics, 87 Fordham 
L. Rev. 1515, 1562, 1576 (2019). 
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govern democracy in the U.S. today. These remnants of white supre–
macy negate and impair much of the voting rights expansion that marks 
our constitutional history since the end of the Civil War. The ongoing 
attack on American democracy strikes us as fundamentally counter-
cultural and thus politically unsustainable. Eventually law will recon–
dition our democracy and politics, rendering racial reform inevitable. 
To be clear, we do not contest the notion that a limited democracy is 
necessary to avert a tyranny of the majority. Rather, we contest the 
tyranny-of-minority rule that seeks to entrench privilege and raw 
economic and political power beyond the reach of democratic gover–
nance. As we will show in the next part of this Article, race, democracy, 
and the emergent U.S. oligarchy tightly intertwine. 
I. Race and the Attack on U.S. Democracy 
Professor Nancy MacLean recently documented what she terms the 
“radical right’s” efforts to diminish democratic power and influence in 
our government, paving the way for the restoration of an oligarchy to 
legally protect the interests of the very wealthy.30 A small number of 
billionaires and millionaires lead this effort, and they enjoy powerful 
“intellectual” support from the many scholars they patronize.31 Race 
plays a central role in this effort even if the propagators of an oligarchy 
today hold little interest in restoring the racial oppression of yester–
year.32 Today, they intend to emasculate the federal government’s 
ability to fund social spending and investment so that taxes and 
spending remain permanently low regardless of the impact on economic 
growth or the public’s desire.33 Incidentally, they would denude the 
 
30. Nancy MacLean, Democracy in Chains, at xxxi (2017) (“Pushed by 
relatively small numbers of radical-right billionaires and millionaires who 
have become profoundly hostile to America’s modern system of govern–
ment, an apparatus decades in the making, funded by those same billionaires 
and millionaires, has been working to undermine the normal governance 
of our democracy.”). 
31. See id. at xxxii. 
32. See id. at 233–34. 
33. Professor MacLean summarizes the dream of the radical right: 
the uncontested sway of the wealthiest citizens; the use of right 
to work laws and other ploys to keep working people powerless; 
the ability to fire dissenting public employees at will, targeting 
educators in particular; the use of voting-rights restrictions to 
keep those unlikely to agree with the elite from the polls; the 
deployment of states’ rights to deter the federal government from 
promoting equal treatment; the hostility to public education; the 
regressive tax system; the opposition to Social Security and 
Medicare; and the parsimonious response to public needs of all 
kinds. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 1·2019 
Deracialization and Democracy 
91 
federal government’s ability to ever breakdown our festering racial hier–
archy.34 
MacLean situates the intellectual roots of this anti-democratic 
movement in John C. Calhoun’s efforts to maintain a slave-holding 
oligarchy in the U.S.35 Calhoun epitomized the white supremacy under–
lying slavery’s perpetuation at the nation’s founding.36 “Not surprise–
ingly, then, but with devastating consequences all around, attacks on 
federal power pitched to nonelites have almost always tapped white 
racial anxiety, whether overtly or with coded language.”37 The use of 
 
 Id. at 233. 
34. For example, in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 
567 U.S. 519 (2012), the Court seemingly recast the Commerce Clause in 
a narrow fashion that could threaten innumerable federal programs and 
actions. See MacLean, supra note 30, at 229–30. The radical right’s view 
of the Constitution would validate strict limits on the government’s 
ability to regulate business in accord with Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 
45 (1905). See MacLean, supra note 30, at 227–28. The radical right also 
prefers that the Equal Protection Clause operate to protect the “already 
privileged rather than the embattled citizens whose rights the [Fourteenth 
Amendment] was designed to protect.” Id. at 228. Congress promulgated 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, for example, under the Commerce Clause. 
E.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 295 (1964) (upholding, 
unanimously, Title II of the Act under the Commerce Clause). 
35. MacLean, supra note 30, at 2–3. 
36. James W. Loewen, 10 Questions for Yale’s President, Chron. Higher 
Educ. (May 25, 2016) https://www.chronicle.com/article/10-Questions-
for-Yale-s/236593 [https://perma.cc/T2R3-Z387]. Yale University 
ultimately renamed its Calhoun College after finding that Calhoun’s 
legacy principally revolved around racism and bigotry. See Office of the 
President, Decision on the Name of Calhoun College, Yale U. (Feb. 11, 
2017), https://president.yale.edu/decision-name-calhoun-college [https:// 
 perma.cc/V8AK-BMQF]; Letter from The Presidential Advisory Group 
on Renaming Calhoun College to Peter Salovey, President, Yale U. (Jan. 
13, 2017), available at https://president.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/ 
 Presidential%20Advisory%20Group%20-%20Calhoun%2001_13_17.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V34C-Y94R]. At the time of the renaming decision, 
Yale President Peter Salovey stated: “John C. Calhoun’s legacy as a white 
supremacist and a national leader who passionately promoted slavery as 
a ‘positive good’ fundamentally conflicts with Yale’s mission and values.” 
Yale Changes Calhoun College’s Name to Honor Grace Murray Hopper, 
YaleNews (Feb. 11, 2017), https://news.yale.edu/2017/02/11/yale-change- 
 calhoun-college-s-name-honor-grace-murray-hopper-0 [https://perma.cc/ 
 9HAX-W5GE]. 
37. MacLean, supra note 30, at 11. Calhoun openly acknowledged that the 
South used race to obscure class divisions: 
With us the two great divisions of society are not the rich and 
poor, but white and black; and all the former, the poor as well as 
the rich, belong to the upper class, and are respected and treated 
as equals, if honest and industrious; and hence have a position 
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race instrumentally worked in America as a means of dividing the lower 
classes, disenfranchising black as well as white voters, and supporting 
policies to protect wealth more than social well-being.38 Along the way, 
the Southern oligarchs used their influence to “ennoble” Southern 
racism and strategically demean African Americans.39 Economic back–
wardness followed in the wake of these efforts to destroy human 
capabilities under the guise of race.40 
Today’s oligarchs operate in much the same way, even if they target 
the nation as a whole rather than just the South as in decades past. 
They spend billions of dollars to socially construct knowledge41 in favor 
of their political agenda and to influence academic areas ranging from 
economics42 to law.43 “Now, as then, the leaders seek Calhoun-style 
 
and pride of character of which neither poverty nor misfortune 
can deprive them. 
 John C. Calhoun, Speech on the Oregon Bill (June 27, 1848), in The U.S. 
Constitution: A Reader 419, 420 (Hillsdale C. Pol. Faculty eds., 2012), 
available at http://cdn.constitutionreader.com/files/pdf/constitution/ch76.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Y7N4-ZK3K]. 
38. MacLean, supra note 30, at 23. 
39. Id. at 33. 
40. For example, in response to Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 
(1954), Virginia closed its schools. MacLean, supra note 30, at 23. 
Professor MacLean highlights that this decision hardly followed any 
democratic voice; instead, a tight oligarchy controlled Virginia, such that 
the rural state senators voting for school shutdowns represented fewer 
Virginians than those urban-area senators who favored complying with 
Brown. MacLean, supra note 30, at 23. It was only with the passage of 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 that the control of this oligarchy broke and 
a “cornucopia of economic growth” followed, particularly in Northern 
Virginia. Id. at 92–93. 
41. Ultimately elites will distort knowledge to instrumentally serve their goals. 
See MacLean, supra note 30, at 33.”  
42. In economics, economist James Buchanan worked closely with large 
corporations and other mega-donors to form quasi-academic institutions 
for the purpose of funding scholars with pro-free market and anti-spending 
inclinations to influence policy-makers and inculcate students in free-
market dogma. MacLean, supra note 30, at 119–22. Some of these 
institutions operated with only the thinnest veil of academic legitimacy. 
Id. at 198. Indeed, even Buchanan himself protested (to no avail) the fact 
that his namesake James Buchanan Center had no academic standing at 
all. Id. at 203. 
43. In law, the political efforts to impose laissez-faire policies hit their zenith 
in the law and economics movement. See George L. Priest, Michael 
Trebilcock and the Past and Future of Law and Economics, 60 U. 
Toronto L.J. 155, 156 (2010) (describing the origins of law and 
economics as a “pro-market, anti-government political philosophy”). Key 
leaders in this movement included Henry Manne at George Mason 
University, who benefitted mightily from corporate patronage and radical-
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liberty for the few—the liberty to concentrate vast wealth, so as to dent 
elementary fairness and freedom to the many.”44 Further, because they 
know that Americans generally do not favor the re-imposition of an 
oligarchy, they deploy stealth and subterfuge (including the strategic 
use of racial divisions) to subvert our democracy.45 Race is particularly 
potent in suppressing the vote—both white and minority.46 MacLean 
shares much in common with other scholars who study both the radical 
right and the role of race in fueling its descent to minority rule.47 
For example, Professor Ian Haney-López demonstrates the use of 
“dog-whistle politics” to entrench the interests of political and economic 
elites, and the use of race in America to disempower both working-class 
whites and communities of color.48 He argues in his book, Dog Whistle 
Politics, that “politicians backed by concentrated wealth manipulate 
racial appeals to win elections and also to win support for regressive 
policies that help corporations and the super-rich, and in the process 
wrecking the middle class.”49 Among the many startling realities he 
highlights: no Democratic candidate for the White House won a 
 
right billionaires such as Charles Koch. MacLean, supra note 30, at 122, 
126. Manne awarded economist James Buchanan a law-and-economics 
award even as Buchanan openly pursued the goal of imposing an anti-
democratic oligarchy in the name of his crusade for “economic liberty.” 
Id. at 152. Another law-and-economics luminary urged restricting voting 
rights to “property owners, educated classes, [and] employed persons.” Id. 
(quoting George Stigler, Why Have the Socialists Been Winning?, 
Presidential Address to the Mont Pelerin Society (1978)). Ultimately, 
Manne operated a “law and economics” institute to inculcate more than 
forty percent of the federal judiciary in the so-called benefits of laissez-
faire economics. Id. at 195. 
44. MacLean, supra note 30, at 234. 
45. Id. at 151–53, 234. 
46. Id. at 231. 
47. See Jane Mayer, Dark Money 3–46, 167–76, 182–85 (2016) (highlighting 
the use of a “fully integrated network” of academic programs, think tanks, 
and advocacy groups bent on imposing libertarian policies and funded by 
a tight network of billionaires uninterested in racist policies but willing to 
use race to buttress their cause); Ramirez, supra note 8, at 152–56 (tying 
racial politics and the Southern Strategy to the financial deregulation and 
exploitation that drove the Great Financial Crisis); Sellers, supra note 29, 
at 1525, 1529, 1531–32 (“[W]hite identity politics is a pervasive political 
feature, habitually exploited by the Republican Party.”). 
48. Ian Haney López, Dog Whistle Politics, at ix (2014) (“In the last 50 
years, dog whistle politics has driven broad swaths of white voters to 
adopt a self-defeating hostility to government, and in the process has 
remade the very nature of race and racism. American politics today—and 
the crisis of the middle class—cannot be understood without recognizing 
racism’s evolution and the power of pernicious demagoguery.”). 
49. Id. at xii. 
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majority of white votes since the election of 1964, or stated differently, 
since the effectiveness of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.50 Even in the 
election of 1964, five southern states swung to the GOP and since then 
have formed the reliable base upon which the GOP thrives.51 Richard 
Nixon successfully ascended to the presidency in 1968 thanks in part to 
the “Southern Strategy” he deployed to attract disenchanted working-
class whites across the nation who fundamentally opposed racial 
integration and equality.52 Today, white voters constitute about ninety 
percent of the GOP’s base; and whites constitute ninety-eight percent 
of elected GOP officials.53 As such, Professor Haney López concludes 
that these phenomena have “transmogrif[ied] the GOP into the ‘white 
man’s party.’”54 
To be fair, both parties have at varying times, and to varying 
degrees, engaged in similar “race-baiting.”55 Yet, the history of race in 
America and the current social realities favor the radical right because 
of racial stereotypes regarding such things as crime and welfare.56 Thus, 
Haney López shows that empirically racial-coding works on issues of 
crime and welfare spending, but only to the extent that such coding 
 
50. See id. at 211, app. at 233. 
51. Michael Oreskes, Civil Rights Act Leaves Deep Mark On the American 
Political Landscape, N.Y. Times (July 2, 1989), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
 1989/07/02/us/civil-rights-act-leaves-deep-mark-on-the-american-political-
landscape.html [https://perma.cc/XS8V-5VXJ]. See also Haney López, 
supra note 48, at 212 (recounting Lyndon Johnson’s lament that “I think 
we just delivered the South to the Republican party for a long time to 
come”). 
52. Haney López, supra note 48, at 25–27. Two GOP chairmen, Michael 
Steele and Ken Mehlman, admitted that the party used the so-called 
Southern Strategy’s racial hostility and coded language to attract 
working-class voters. Ramirez, supra note 8, at 152. President Nixon, as 
well as at least two of his senior aides, also essentially admitted to using 
racial anxiety and racial divisions as a political tool. Haney López, supra 
note 48, at 24–27. 
53. Haney López, supra note 48, at 212. Professor Haney López notes that 
these percentages date from before the so-called Tea Party backlash to 
the Obama presidency. Id. at 147–59. 
54. Id. at 212. 
55. Bill Clinton, My Life 395 (2005) (admitting that he proposed a “new 
Democratic Party” in response to the claims of so-called Reagan Democrats 
that the government was taking their money and giving it to blacks); see 
also Haney López, supra note 48, at 22–34 (describing Richard Nixon’s 
use of race-baiting in the 1968 election and the strategies employed by 
Democrats and Republicans in the South). 
56. Thus, for example, Nixon famously emphasized “law and order.” Haney 
López, supra note 48, at 23–24. Ronald Reagan’s campaign rhetoric 
included terminology that culled up race, such as “welfare queen” or 
“strapping young bucks” buying steaks with food stamps. Id. at 4. 
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does not vault the issue into the forefront of voters’ minds.57 In 
experiments testing the effectiveness of “dog whistles” that appeal to 
subconscious racial stereotypes, researchers found that “whites temper 
their response to dog whistle pandering once they understand a political 
appeal as racial.”58 Haney López traces the evolution of dog-whistle 
politics through to the present, concluding that despite protestations 
that it was a fundamentally non-racist movement, “the Tea Party was 
almost wholly a creature of rightwing dog whistle politics.”59 
After the election of 2016, Ian Haney López and Robert Reich 
applied the lessons of Dog Whistle Politics to Donald Trump: 
Trump’s election reflects the triumph of dog-whistle politics—the 
use of (barely) coded racial appeals to mobilize white voters who 
have become anxious about their social position and economic 
standing. Nothing better illustrates this strategy’s potency than 
the demographics of Trump’s support. Exit polls show non-
Hispanic whites contributed 86 percent of Trump’s votes, while a 
further 3.4 percent came from Hispanic whites. African Americans 
constituted only 2 percent of Trump’s votes.60  
Trump’s campaign focused on exaggerated dangers posed by 
Mexican immigrants and Muslims, and his solution accordingly focused 
on banning further entry of such groups into the U.S.61 Haney López 
and Reich suggest that “Democrats develop a narrative about how 
political opportunists have used race and gender to divide us, to 
demonize government in the eyes of many working-class whites, and to 
prevent us from joining together in a broad-based coalition to fight 
widening inequalities of income, wealth, and political power.”62 
The suppression of voting rights plays a central role in the 
subversion of democracy.63 The radical right does not hesitate to fund 
efforts to intimidate voters, harkening back to similar efforts during the 
 
57. Id. at 176–81. 
58. Id. at 179. 
59. Id. at 158. 
60. Ian Haney López & Robert Reich, The Way Forward for Democrats Is to 
Address Both Class and Race, The Nation (Dec. 12, 2016), https://www. 
 thenation.com/article/the-way-forward-for-democrats-is-to-address-both-
class-and-race/ [https://perma.cc/W4XQ-2RVE]. 
61. Id. 
62. Id.; see also Sellers, supra note 29, at 1529–32 (showing how Donald 
Trump mobilized political support around white-identity politics and an 
aggressively racist agenda). 
63. Haney López, supra note 48, at 159. 
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Jim Crow era.64 These efforts, typically aimed at minority communities, 
operate under the guise of voter-fraud myths.65 According to Haney 
López: “Despite intensive, highly motivated efforts to find voter fraud, 
the data suggests that voter impersonation happens with roughly the 
same frequency that persons are struck and killed by lightening [sic].”66 
In fact, President Trump’s commission to find voter fraud quietly failed 
in its mission.67 Nevertheless, the right argues in favor of disenfranch–
ising poor people, in favor of restrictive voter identification laws, and 
in favor of felony-disenfranchisement laws.68 All of this activity enjoys 
billionaires’ support, particularly through the Koch-funded American 
Legislative Exchange Council (“ALEC”).69 In moments of candor, their 
objective of restoring an oligarchy in America becomes clear, as the 
founder of ALEC once stated: “I don’t want everybody to vote. . . . As 
a matter of fact, our leverage in the elections quite candidly goes up as 
the voting populace goes down.”70 
These voter-suppression efforts effectively changed the political 
landscape. After the 2010 mid-term elections, ALEC successfully 
introduced more than 180 bills to restrict voting rights across the 
nation.71 For example, according to a University of Wisconsin study, in 
Wisconsin, which Donald Trump won by about 22,000 votes state-
wide,72 a new voter-ID law deterred or prevented about 25,000 predom–
 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. (citing Brennan Ctr. for Justice, The Truth About “Voter 
Fraud” (2006), available at https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/ 
 files/legacy/d/download_file_38347.pdf [https://perma.cc/XET3-GJKU] 
(“Raising the unsubstantiated specter of mass voter fraud suits a part–
icular policy agenda. . . . Fraud by individual voters is both irrational and 
extremely rare.”) (emphasis omitted)). 
67. Marina Villeneuve, Report: Trump Commission Did Not Find Widespread 
Voter Fraud, Associated Press (Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/ 
 f5f6a73b2af546ee97816bb35e82c18d [https://perma.cc/W247-AW5u]. 
68. Haney López, supra note 48, at 160–61. 
69. Ari Natter, Koch-Funded Group Prods Trump’s EPA to Say Climate 
Change Not a Risk, Bloomberg (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.bloomberg 
 .com/news/articles/2017-11-15/coal-funded-alec-prods-trump-to-say-climate-
change-not-a-risk [https://perma.cc/V6SH-TKVM]. 
70. Haney López, supra note 48, at 161. For a video of the statement, see 
People for the American Way, Paul Weyrich—“I Don’t Want Everybody 
to Vote” (Goo Goo), YouTube (Jun. 8, 2007), https://www.youtube.com/ 
 watch?v=8GBAsFwPglw [https://perma.cc/JD5G-5R5B]. 
71. MacLean, supra note 30, at 231. 
72. Wisconsin Election Comm’n, Canvass Results for 2016 General 
Election 1 (2016), available at https://elections.wi.gov/sites/elections.wi. 
 gov/files/Statewide%20Results%20All%20Offices%20%28post-Presidential% 
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inantly lower-income citizens from casting their ballots in Milwaukee 
and Dane Counties alone.73 The study also found that “8.3% of white 
registrants were deterred, compared to 27.5% of African Americans.”74 
No study can certainly determine how these voters would vote if not 
deterred or prevented from doing so, but a functioning democracy 
requires leaders committed to securing the vote, not to preventing 
citizens from voting.75 The leaders advocating for restrictive voting laws 
seek to thwart democracy, and to use race instrumentally to do so, with 
full knowledge that minority voters will be disproportionately disen–
franchised.76 
In terms of actual policy impact, the Trump Administration’s tax 
cut, tilted heavily towards the rich and adding to the nation’s debt 
burden while delivering modest benefits to most Americans, proves the 
 
 20recount%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7SM-BNN9].  
73. Press Release, Election Research Ctr. at the Univ. of Wis., Voter ID Study 
Shows Turnout Effects in 2016 Wisconsin Presidential Election (Sept. 25, 
2017) [hereinafter Wisconsin Voter ID Study] (available at https://elections. 
 wiscweb.wisc.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/483/2018/02/Voter-ID-Study-
Release.pdf [https://perma.cc/FZ8Q-G9KC]). “Roughly 80% of registrants 
who were deterred from voting by the ID law, and 77% of those prevented 
from voting, cast ballots in the 2012 election.” Id. Of course, “[t]he 
burdens of voter ID fell disproportionately on low-income and minority 
populations. Among low-income registrants (household income under 
$25,000), 21.1% were deterred, compared to 7.2% for those over $25,000. 
Among high-income registrants (over $100,000 household income), 2.7% 
were deterred.” Id. While these numbers dramatize the kind of oligarchy 
the radical right works to achieve, it is impossible to know with certainty 
if the ID law changed the outcome of the election. See Eugene Kiely, 
FactChecking Clinton’s Voter Suppression Claims, FactCheck.org 
(Mar. 17, 2019), https://www.factcheck.org/2019/03/factchecking-clintons-
voter-suppression-claims/ [https://perma.cc/2PWV-423M] (explaining 
that the Wisconsin report could not accurately assess the link between the 
drop in voter turnout and the new ID laws). 
74. Wisconsin Voter ID Study, supra note 73.   
75. Indeed, one factor in the Economist Intelligence Unit’s index of democracy 
is voter turnout. EIU Democracy Index, supra note 6, at 7. 
76. Dan Hopkins, What We Know About Voter ID Laws, FiveThirtyEight 
(Aug. 21, 2018, 7:07 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/what-we-
know-about-voter-id-laws/ [https://perma.cc/M8NP-J4L5] (citing Seth 
C. McKee, Politics is Local: State Legislator Voting on Restrictive Voter 
Identification Legislation, Res. & Pol., July–Sept. 2015, at 1, 6 
(“Republicans are much more supportive of restrictive voter ID 
legislation . . . . It is also worth noting that, in alignment with the 
coalitional bases of support for the major parties, among Republican 
legislators, a higher black district population increases legislators’ support 
for voter ID, whereas among Democratic lawmakers, a higher black 
district population reduces legislators’ likelihood of voting in favor of 
restrictive voter ID legislation.”) (citations omitted)). 
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point that dog-whistle politics aim at helping the wealthy become 
wealthier rather than specifically intending to harm minorities.77 Those 
in the top-twenty percent of the income distribution scored eight times 
the tax benefits from those cuts than those in the bottom-twenty 
percent.78 These gains add to a forty-year run of elite gains (and stag–
nation for most Americans) in after-tax income driven primarily by 
relentless tax cuts for the very wealthy.79 
The Trump Administration also waged an unprecedented and 
unprincipled war on regulation. Specifically, it mandated that govern–
ment agencies promulgate no new regulations without repealing two 
regulations.80 Deregulation creates further opportunities for elite 
enrich–ment, ranging from the fraudulent peddling of subprime 
mortgage debt to profiteering from underpriced carbon.81 Concentrated 
wealth naturally leads to elites subverting the law and regulations 
through job offers, campaign contributions, electioneering expenditures, 
and a wide range of patronage benefits.82 Concentrated wealth similarly 
opens wide opportunities for the social construction of knowledge to 
further facilitate profiteering through an intellectually polluted body 
politic and an ultimately corrupted law.83 All of this allows elites to 
exploit the system for windfall payoffs while imposing trillions of dollars 
in costs upon the global economy.84 
The Great Financial Crisis of 2008 provides a textbook example. 
The crisis originated in the political power of financial elites to free 
themselves from regulations and laws dating back to the New Deal.85 
 
77. See Ben Steverman et al., A Year After the Middle Class Tax Cut, the 
Rich Are Winning, Bloomberg (Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.bloomberg. 
 com/graphics/2018-tax-plan-consequences/ [https://perma.cc/TX5K-GZEJ] 
(analyzing the effects of President Trump’s tax cuts). 
78. Id. 
79. Since 1980, after-tax income for about half of all Americans has stagnated 
at about $16,000 per annum (adjusted for inflation), while income for 
those in the top-one percent of the income distribution soared from 
$420,000 to $1.3 million. Thomas Piketty et al., Distributional National 
Accounts: Methods and Estimates for the United States, 133 Q.J. Econ. 
553, 557 (2018). The highest growth rate lies at the very top (0.0001 
percentile) of the population. Id. at 579. This concentration of wealth in 
very few hands explains the subversion of law and regulation that drove 
all aspects of the financial crisis. Ramirez, supra note 8, at 1–5, 36–37. 
80. Exec. Order No. 13,771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9,339 (Jan. 30, 2017).  
81. Ramirez, supra note 8, at 8–9. 
82. Id. at 3–5.  
83. Id. 
84. Id. at 1–10. 
85. Id. at 1–16. 
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The crisis contributed to the greatest upward transfer of wealth in 
modern American history.86 Financial elites took out-sized compen–
sation payments while the American and global economies paid the 
tab.87 Indeed, a recent assessment put the cost at $70,000 per U.S. 
resident.88 Despite the loot garnered, no senior manager at any major 
bank faced any real legal accountability under the rigged financial 
regulatory and corporate governance systems.89 Global warming 
promises even more costs upon the general population for the gross 
enrichment of carbon-selling elites.90 
Thus, the radical right’s efforts to reinstall an oligarchy through 
the suppression of democracy and dog-whistle politics have achieved 
great success. The relentless tax cuts and drive for deregulation over 
the past forty years witnessed a remarkable after-tax income explosion 
at the very tip-top (top .001%) of the income distribution at the expense 
of over ninety-nine percent of all Americans.91 Only legal and regulatory 
restructuring currently suffices to explain this aberrational increase in 
 
86. For example: 
During the crisis, African-Americans experienced a 53% decline 
and Hispanic a 66% decline compared to a 16% decline for white 
households. There was [also] a significant racial difference in 
wealth recovery after the Crisis . . . from 2010 to 2013, the median 
wealth of white households increased from $138,600 to $141,900, 
or by 2.4%. By contrast, the median wealth of black households 
fell 33.7%, from $16,600 in 2010 to $11,000 in 2013. Among 
Hispanics, median wealth decreased by 14.3%, from $16,000 to 
$13,700. 
 Emma Coleman Jordan, The Hidden Structures of Inequality: The Federal 
Reserve and a Cascade of Failures, 2 U. Pa. J.L. & Pub. Aff. 107, 112 
(2017). Furthermore, across racial groups, the top ten percent enjoyed 
relative wealth gains while the rest of Americans lost. Id. at 134. 
87. Patrice Ollivaud & David Turner, The Effect of the Global Financial 
Crisis on OECD Potential Output, 2014 OECD J.: Econ. Stud. 41, 48–
49 (2015) (showing output gap in U.S. at 3.3%; Italy, 6.0%; and Greece, 
12.9%). 
88. Regis Barnichon et al., The Financial Crisis at 10: Will We Ever 
Recover?, FRBSF Econ. Letter (Aug. 13, 2018), https://www.frbsf.org/ 
 economic-research/files/el2018-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DXD-HSGP] 
(finding that “the U.S. economy remains significantly smaller than it 
should be based on its pre-crisis growth trend” and that “[t]he size of 
those losses suggests that the level of output is unlikely to revert to its 
pre-crisis trend level. This represents a lifetime present-value income loss 
of about $70,000 for every American.”). 
89. Mary K. Ramirez & Steven A. Ramirez, The Case for the Corp–
orate Death Penalty xi–xiv (2017). 
90. Steven A. Ramirez, The Law and Macroeconomics of Climate Change and 
Inequality (forthcoming 2020). 
91. Piketty et al., supra note 79, at 578. 
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inequality; in other words, inequality reflects the legal re-engineering of 
income distribution in favor of the wealthy and powerful.92 These facts 
profoundly altered political outcomes. Law re-channeled power in favor 
of the very wealthy and entrenched their economic and political 
privileges. 
The next part of this Article demonstrates the Supreme Court’s 
recent role in concretizing the high income inequality arising from forty 
years of legal change favoring the very wealthy. 
II. The Supreme Court’s New Oligarchy 
Another major flaw in American democracy is political and racial 
gerrymandering, as the Supreme Court itself acknowledges.93 On March 
29, 2019, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in two cases that 
raised issues relating to political and racial gerrymandering.94 Some 
commentators suggested that the Court should consider political 
realities and the “vastness of white identity politics”95 in determining 
Equal Protection violations, as it did in the unanimous decision of 
White v. Regester.96 Instead, the Court held that partisan gerryman–
 
92. Id. at 604–05. 
93. The Supreme Court Does Not Like Gerrymandering, Economist (Mar. 
28, 2019), https://www.economist.com/united-states/2019/03/30/the-
supreme-court-does-not-like-gerrymandering [https:perma.cc/R4AG-CPT5]. 
94. Amy Howe, Argument Analysis: Justices Divided and Hard to Read on 
Partisan Gerrymandering, SCOUTUSblog (Mar. 26, 2019, 3:45 PM), 
https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/03/argument-analysis-justices-divided-
and-hard-to-read-on-partisan-gerrymandering/ [https://perma.cc/A8MM-
ZNRB]. 
95. Sellers, supra note 29, at 1532–60. 
96. 412 U.S. 755 (1973). The Court, invalidating multimember districts used 
to dilute minority voting power, wrote:  
[W]e have entertained claims that multimember districts are being 
used invidiously to cancel out or minimize the voting strength of 
racial groups. To sustain such claims, it is not enough that the 
racial group allegedly discriminated against has not had legislative 
seats in proportion to its voting potential. The plaintiffs’ burden 
is to produce evidence to support findings that the political 
processes leading to nomination and election were not equally 
open to participation by the group in question—that its members 
had less opportunity than did other residents in the district to 
participate in the political processes and to elect legislators of their 
choice. 
 Id. at 765–66 (citations omitted). The Court has since overruled this 
approach. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62 (1980) (plurality 
opinion) (“Our decisions . . . have made clear that action by a State that 
is racially neutral on its face violates the Fifteenth Amendment only if 
motivated by a discriminatory purpose.”). 
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dering presents political questions beyond judicial review, essentially 
giving a green light to any racial gerrymandering parading as merely 
political gerrymandering.97 
Haney López suggests that the GOP more aggressively carves out 
Congressional districts favorable to GOP rule than do Democrats.98 The 
facts support his position: “The AP scrutinized the outcomes of all 435 
U.S. House races . . . using a new statistical method of calculating 
partisan advantage designed to detect potential political gerryman–
dering.”99 It found that “among the two dozen most populated states 
that determine the vast majority of Congress, there were nearly three 
times as many with Republican-tilted U.S. House districts.”100 This 
permitted the GOP to enjoy a ten percent advantage in total House 
seats with only a one percent popular-vote advantage.101 In 2018, 
gerrymandering protected many GOP seats from shifting to the Demo–
crats.102 On this front, some leaders now advocate for non-partisan 
redistricting.103 
The Supreme Court figures prominently in any account of the 
installation of a new American oligarchy.104 Professor MacLean notes 
 
97. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506–07 (2019); Jon 
Greenbaum & Kristen Clarke, Gerrymandering Symposium: The 
Racial Implications of Yesterday’s Partisan Gerrymandering Decision,  
 SCOTUSblog (June 28, 2019, 2:01 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/ 
 2019/06/gerrymandering-symposium-the-racial-implications-of-todays-
partisan-gerrymandering-decision/ [https://perma.cc/Z5HX-N86M]. 
98. Haney López, supra note 48, at 161 (“The Republicans won control of 
the House by a 234 to 201 margin, yet the Democrats cumulatively 
received 1.4 million more votes.”). 
99. David A. Lieb, AP Analysis Shows How Gerrymandering Benefited GOP 
in 2016, Associated Press (June 25, 2017), https://www.apnews.com/ 
 e3c5cc51faba4b7fb67d8a3f996bdaca [https://perma.cc/8Y2M-GB7S]. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
102. Brett Neely & Sean McMinn, Voters Rejected Gerrymandering in 2018, but 
Some Lawmakers Try to Hold Power, NPR (Dec. 28, 2018, 5:00 AM), https:// 
 www.npr.org/2018/12/28/675763553/voters-rejected-gerrymandering-in-
2018-but-some-lawmakers-try-to-hold-power [https://perma.cc/3CWL-5V3E]. 
103. Id.; see also The Supreme Court Does Not Like Gerrymandering, supra 
note 93 (“Justice Neil Gorsuch picked up on this in response to the claim 
that the Supreme Court ‘must act because nobody else can’. About 20 
states, he noted, have ‘dealt with this problem through citizen initiatives’ 
handing over map-drawing to bipartisan or independent commissions, and 
a ‘bunch more’ will be on the ballot in 2020. Justice Kavanaugh agreed 
that ‘a fair amount of activity’ in the states may free the Supreme Court 
from the ‘big lift’ of policing partisan gerrymandering.”).  
104. According to Washington Post columnist E.J. Dionne, Jr.: 
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that during the nineteenth century the Court aimed to preserve the 
privileges of the powerful, and today the radical right openly seeks to 
control the Supreme Court for its project to wrest control of the 
government from the democratically empowered masses.105 Like Prof–
essor MacLean, Professor Haney López also zeros in on the Supreme 
Court as the key institution for the subversion of democracy.106 The 
Court’s power and its lack of democratic accountability led the radical 
right to seize control of it by all means necessary. 
The Senate recently politicized the Court through historic 
overreach. It simply defied President Obama’s constitutional power to 
nominate Supreme Court justices when it refused to vote on the 
Supreme Court nomination of Merrick Garland.107 The installations of 
 
On cases involving the right of Americans to vote and the ability 
of a very small number of very rich people to exercise unlimited 
influence on the political process, Chief Justice John G. Roberts 
Jr. and his four allies always side with the wealthy, the powerful 
and the forces that would advance the political party that put 
them on the court. 
 E.J. Dionne Jr., Supreme Oligarchy, Wash. Post (Apr. 6, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ej-dionne-jr-supreme-oligarchy/ 
 2014/04/06/823f15ea-bc2e-11e3-9a05-c739f29ccb08_story.html?utm_term= 
 .77883049456a [perma.cc/P3HN-3L9J]; see also Chemerinsky, supra note 
10 (concluding that, institutionally, the Court operates to protect the 
interests of dominant political and economic elites rather than individual 
rights or long-term values). 
105. MacLean, supra note 30, at 227–30 (detailing efforts to use the Supreme 
Court to permanently disable the federal and state governments to enact 
progressive legislation similar to pre-Depression notions of government 
power) (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down 
state labor regulation based upon Fourteenth Amendment)); Nat’l Fed’n 
of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (narrowing the scope of 
the Commerce Clause)). 
106. See Haney López, supra note 48, at 144, 161. 
107. Ron Elving, What Happened With Merrick Garland In 2016 And Why It 
Matters Now, NPR (June 29, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/ 
 06/29/624467256/what-happened-with-merrick-garland-in-2016-and-why-it-
matters-now [https://perma.cc2LUE-ZHW2]. According to one scholar: 
[The] door has now been opened to . . . politically motivated 
Senate moratoriums on Supreme Court nominations. The 
encroachment and impairment that it entails cast[s] grave doubt 
on its constitutionality, and it currently finds no safe harbor in 
historical practice. Whether the imposition of such a moratorium 
will continue to present a grave constitutional question, however, 
depends on what tradition develops now that the door has been 
opened. The potential evils of further expansion are already audible 
just over the horizon. Calling out the probable constitutional 
invalidity of the McConnell moratorium, clearly repudiating it, 
and preventing a repetition and expansion are imperative if the 
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Justice Kavanaugh as well as Justice Gorsuch produced a historic first: 
justices nominated by a president who lacked majority-vote approval108 
and confirmed by a Senate that lacked majority-vote approval.109 This 
could operate as arguably the greatest triumph of minority rule in U.S. 
history.110 It is certainly the crowning achievement of a long-standing 
campaign by the radical right to cement long-term control of the Court 
by all means necessary.111 
 Recent case law shows that the oligarchs’ efforts have paid off. 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission112 illustrates well the 
 
practice is not to gain a constitutional safe harbor in a newly 
established tradition. 
 J. Stephen Clark, Senators Can’t Be Choosers: Moratoriums on Supreme 
Court Nominations and the Separation of Powers, 106 Ky. L.J. 337, 408 
(2018). 
108. Gregory Krieg, It’s Official: Clinton Swamps Trump in Popular Vote, 
CNN (Dec. 22, 2016, 5:34 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2016/12/21/politics/ 
 donald-trump-hillary-clinton-popular-vote-final-count/index.html [https:// 
 perma.cc/3FWM-DASB]. 
109. See Rick Noack, How to Explain to Someone Living Abroad that 
Democrats Can Have over 10 Million more Senate Votes and Still Lose, 
Wash. Post (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2018/ 
 11/07/how-explain-someone-living-abroad-that-democrats-can-have-over-
million-more-senate-votes-still-lose/?utm_term=.14a4add505c3 [https:// 
 perma.cc/SM77-QNQ5] (describing how Democratic candidates in both 
2016 and 2018 received millions more votes than Republican candidates, 
yet the GOP controls the Senate and, thus, the Supreme Court 
nomination process); see also Aaron Blake, Democrats Won the Senate 
Popular Vote! Which is Both True and Terribly Misleading, Wash. Post 
(Nov. 29, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/ 
 11/29/the-most-bogus-stat-of-the-2016-election-how-democrats-won-the-
senate-popular-vote/?utm_term=.f1905bb3a2ce [https://perma.cc/UE5L-
CZ6V]. 
110. See Michael Tomasky, The Supreme Court’s Legitimacy Crisis, N.Y. 
Times, (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/05/opinion/ 
 supreme-courts-legitimacy-crisis.html [https://perma.cc/QHN4-2E8X] 
(“[I]n an age of 5-4 partisan decisions, we’re on the verge of having a five-
member majority who figure to radically rewrite our nation’s laws. And 
four of them will have been narrowly approved by senators representing 
minority will.”). 
111. See Brandon Bartels, It Took Conservatives 50 Years to Get a Reliable 
Majority on the Supreme Court. Here Are 3 Reasons Why., Wash. Post 
(June 29, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/ 
 2018/06/29/it-took-conservatives-50-years-to-get-a-reliable-majority-on-
the-supreme-court-here-are-3-reasons-why/?utm_term=.56227cff95c9 
[https://perma.cc/XT6D-TTP7] (explaining the Republicans’ emphasis 
on appointing “strict constructionist” jurists and the Senate’s elimination 
of the filibuster for judicial appointments). 
112. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
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central importance of the Supreme Court to reigning in democracy by 
all means necessary.113 In Citizens United, the Court ruled that 
corporations enjoy the same free-speech rights as individuals, and 
therefore, governmental restrictions on a corporation’s political speech 
must survive strict scrutiny, the most demanding level of judicial review 
of governmental actions.114 More specifically, the Court held that 
corporations are entitled to First Amendment free-speech protections 
and, as a result, corporate money spent on political electioneering 
independent of a campaign cannot be limited by campaign-finance 
restrictions.115 Emblematic of the judicial activism driving this outcome, 
the Court overruled two of its own precedents on this point, and it also 
limited bi-partisan legislation.116 The billionaires and CEOs seeking 
more concentrated wealth and power won an important political gift as 
a direct result of this legal stretch: the unlimited use of corporate 
(shareholder) wealth, rather than their own cash, to engage in elect–
ioneering.117 Lower courts extended the logic of Citizens United to 
invalidate all limitations on independent electioneering expenditures.118 
The Court doubled down on further empowering the wealthy in 
McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission.119 There, in a 5–4 deci–
sion, the conservative majority ruled that limits on aggregate federal 
 
113. See id. at 365–66 (overruling Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 
494 U.S. 652 (1990) and McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 
93 (2003)). 
114. Id. at 340–43. 
115. Id. at 372 (holding unconstitutional the restriction of corporate independent 
electioneering expenditures under 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2012)). 
116. Id. at 365–66. The unconstitutional statutory section was part of the 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 
81. 
117. Previously, corporate funds could not be used for electioneering purposes, 
forcing CEOs and corporate leaders to finance politicking for their chosen 
candidates from their own capital (typically through Political Action 
Committees (“PACs”)). See generally Bret Shaw, Note, It’s the End of 
the World as We Know It (and I Feel Fine): How Comparative Campaign 
Finance Suggests that Citizens United May Not Be the End of the 
World . . . and that the United States Should Consider Other Policy 
Alternatives, 31 Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 159, 161–64 (2014) 
(describing the evolution of regulating corporate political activity). 
Moreover, “[t]here is no enforceable mandate that the CEO consider 
shareholder interests when deploying for political ends the extraordinary 
capital available to the public firm.” andré douglas pond cummings et al., 
Toward a Critical Corporate Law Pedagogy and Scholarship, 92 Wash. 
U. L. Rev. 397, 418 (2014). 
118. See SpeechNow.org v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 599 F.3d 686, 694–95 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010). 
119. 572 U.S. 185 (2014). 
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campaign contributions ran afoul of the First Amendment.120 Chief 
Justice John Roberts stated: “The Government may no more restrict 
how many candidates or causes a donor may support than it may tell 
a newspaper how many candidates it may endorse.”121 The dissent 
argued that “[t]aken together with [Citizens United], today’s decision 
eviscerates our Nation’s campaign finance laws, leaving a remnant 
incapable of dealing with the grave problems of democratic legitimacy 
that those laws were intended to resolve.”122 The Court seems 
determined to prevent any democratic pressure for election reform from 
achieving success based upon an expansive, even contrived, reading of 
the First Amendment.123 Jeffrey Toobin suggests that more election 
deregulation by judicial fiat is likely: “the language of Chief Justice 
John Roberts’s opinion suggests that the Court remains committed 
to . . . the deregulation of American political campaigns.”124 
This deregulation of money in politics represents a massive shift in 
power and influence, which carries with it significant racial implications 
because wealth is distributed in accordance with our racial hierarchy, 
as is corporate power.125 “Put simply, the Supreme Court transferred 
power from the diverse body politic as a whole to a small handful of 
non-diverse corporate elites.”126 For example, only three African 
Americans hold CEO positions in Fortune 500 firms today.127 Only 
eleven Latinos hold CEO positions.128 Women total five percent of all 
 
120. Id. at 193. There, the Court effectively overruled Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1 (1976), insofar as aggregate contribution limits are concerned. Id. 
at 232–33 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
121. Id. at 204 (majority opinion). 
122. Id. at 233 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
123. See id. (suggesting that the majority “misconstrue[d]” the constitutional 
interests implicated).  
124. Jeffrey Toobin, The John Roberts Project, New Yorker (Apr. 2, 2014), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-john-roberts-
project [https://perma.cc/TF6F-YXKG]. 
125. See Spencer Overton, But Some Are More Equal: Race, Exclusion, and 
Campaign Finance, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 987, 989 (2002) (arguing that allowing 
money into politics “effectively enshrine[s] the existing distribution of 
property as a baseline for political advantage”). 
126. cummings et al., supra note 117, at 421. 
127. Ellen McGirt, raceAhead: Only Three Black CEOs in the Fortune 500, 
Fortune (Mar. 1, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/03/01/raceahead-
three-black-ceos/ [https://perma.cc/5847-M2PP].  
128. Robert Reiss, Latino CEOs Share Insights On Business Success, Forbes 
(Feb. 27, 2018, 2:50 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertreiss/2018/ 
 02/27/latino-ceos-share-insights-on-business-success/#7dc871b52264 [https:// 
 perma.cc/N65X-LNSC]. 
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Fortune 500 CEOs.129 “[T]he apex of corporate leadership remains a 
bastion of white male supremacy.”130 In terms of wealth, only seven 
members of the “Forbes 400 Richest Americans” are African American 
or Latino, and none made the top one hundred.131 It begs credulity that 
the conservative Court majority in Citizens United failed to apprehend 
this distribution of power and wealth when it radically shifted power to 
CEOs and other billionaires by overturning the Bipartisan Campaign 
Reform Act as well as its own precedents.132 
While the Roberts Court zealously guards the rights of those with 
money to freely influence elections, it displays hostility to individuals 
seeking the right to vote. For example, in Husted v. A. Philip Randolph 
Institute,133 the Court upheld Ohio’s purge of its voter rolls despite 
Congressional legislation aimed at stopping the very practice Ohio 
used.134 The Harvard Law Review argued that the case transcended the 
statute at issue: 
Voter suppression is as American as apple pie. Between the 2012 
and 2016 elections, for example, fourteen states enacted laws 
making it harder for citizens to vote. These laws affect minority 
voters with particular intensity. Last Term, in Husted v. A. Philip 
Randolph Institute, the Court upheld an Ohio law that could 
ultimately allow the state to remove from its voter rolls close to 
one million registered voters. While cast as a dry exercise in 
statutory interpretation, Husted is best understood through the 
lens of the nation’s history of race-based voter suppression.135  
 
129. These Are the Women CEOs Leading Fortune 500 Companies, Fortune 
(June 7, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/06/07/fortune-500-women-ceos/ 
[https://perma.cc/N2BN-JQJF]. 
130. cummings et al., supra note 117, at 411. If the Court intended to entrench 
white male power, it would be impossible to do so more efficaciously than 
to give white CEOs unlimited power to spend shareholder wealth on their 
own interests without regard to shareholders’ voices. Id. at 421. 
131. Chuck Collins & Josh Hoxie, Inst. for Policy Studies, Billionaire 
Bonanza 5 (2017), available at https://ips-dc.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
 2017/11/BILLIONAIRE-BONANZA-2017-FinalV.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
 5QQU-2PUT]. 
132. See cummings et al., supra note 117, at 417–23, for a comprehensive critique 
of Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) 
on these grounds.  
133. 138 S. Ct. 1833 (2018). 
134. Id. at 1850 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
135. National Voter Registration Act—Statutory Interpretation—Election Law—
Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Institute, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 437, 437 
(2018) (footnotes omitted). 
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The Review also suggested that the Court should not ignore the 
long history of minority disenfranchisement when weighing statutory 
meaning: 
To ignore the context in which these laws arise—the context of 
this nation’s history—is to betray the legacies of so many who 
have fought and died for the franchise. Even if one assumes Ohio’s 
law was a good-faith effort to ensure the accuracy of voter rolls, 
the Court’s decision offers a roadmap for states whose motives 
are more suspect. To date, at least a dozen states—all of them 
controlled by Republicans—have indicated that they intend to 
adopt a similar plan to purge voter rolls. These purge laws will 
work in concert with other racially inequitable voter-suppression 
tactics like restrictions on early voting, stringent registration 
requirements, and felon disenfranchisement—many of which are 
common in states controlled by Republicans. Though 
undoubtedly less blatant than Jim Crow laws, these tactics may 
be similarly effective given the winner-take-all nature of American 
elections.136  
Justice Sotomayor, in dissent, urged minority communities to act 
against the Roberts Court’s efforts for disenfranchisement, stating: 
“Communities that are disproportionately affected by unnecessarily 
harsh registration laws should not tolerate efforts to marginalize their 
influence in the political process, nor should allies who recognize blatant 
unfairness stand idly by.”137 
Blatant unfairness also describes other Roberts Court efforts to 
favor money over democracy. This far-right majority on the Court also 
applied new legal doctrine138 to overturn a key part of the Voting Rights 
 
136. Id. at 445–46 (footnotes omitted). Other commentators echo this 
assessment. See, e.g., Joshua Douglas, Supreme Court Takes a Giant Step 
Backward on Voter Rights, CNN (June 11, 2018, 6:50 PM), https://www. 
 cnn.com/2018/06/11/opinions/supreme-court-makes-it-harder-to-vote/ 
 index.html [https://perma.cc/3KP4-DLKK] (“The Court once served as 
a bastion of voting rights protection, striking down state practices that 
infringed upon that fundamental right. . . . Today’s decision, however, follows 
a more troubling trend in failing to protect fully the most important right 
in our democracy.”). 
137. A. Philip Randolph Inst., 138 S. Ct. at 1865 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
138. See Neal Kumar Katyal & Thomas P. Schmidt, Active Avoidance: The 
Modern Supreme Court and Legal Change, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 2109, 2133 
n.103 (2015) (“The legal commentariat generally viewed the doctrine as 
an invention.”); Eric Posner, Supreme Court on the Voting Rights Act: 
Chief Justice John Roberts Struck Down Part of the Law for the Lamest 
of Reasons, Slate (June 25, 2013, 1:44 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-
politics/2013/06/supreme-court-on-the-voting-rights-act-chief-justice-john-
roberts-struck-down-part-of-the-law-for-the-lamest-of-reasons.html [https:// 
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Act of 1965 (“VRA”),139 despite the fact that the Court previously 
upheld the very same provision.140 In Shelby County v. Holder,141 the 
Court invalidated section 4(b) of the VRA, which required certain 
states to obtain preclearance on changes to voting requirements.142 The 
Court found that “the conditions that originally justified [§ 5] no longer 
characterize voting in the covered jurisdictions.”143 Dissenting, Justice 
Ginsburg argued that “the Constitution vests broad power in Congress 
to protect the right to vote, and in particular to combat racial 
discrimination in voting. This Court has repeatedly reaffirmed 
Congress’ prerogative to use any rational means in exercise of its power 
in this area.”144 In sum, “[t]he Court’s conservative majority believes 
that the First Amendment gives wealthy donors and powerful 
corporations the carte blanche right to buy an election but that the 
Fifteenth Amendment does not give Americans the right to vote free of 
racial discrimination.”145 The cases above moved the U.S. in the 
 
 perma.cc/S8AR-4YHE]; Richard A. Posner, The Voting Rights Act Ruling 
is About the Conservative Imagination, Slate (June 26, 2013, 12:16 AM), 
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2013/06/the-supreme-court-and-
the-voting-rights-act-striking-down-the-law-is-all-about-conservatives-
imagination.html [https://perma.cc/KVQ2-BLT4]. Some commentators 
suggest the proper precedent for “equal sovereignty” rests in the 
Confederate States of America. See, e.g., Peggy Cooper Davis et al., The 
Persistence of the Confederate Narrative, 84 Tenn. L. Rev. 301, 356 
(2017) (“Justice Roberts, speaking for the Court, embellished the 
Confederate narrative, elevating the status of States to both horizontal 
and vertical sovereignty . . . .”). 
139. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (relevant portions codified at 52 
U.S.C. § 10303 (2012)). 
140. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966); see also Northwest 
Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 197 (2009) 
(declining to hold unconstitutional VRA pre-clearance provisions after 
reauthorization of the Act in 2006). 
141. 570 U.S. 529 (2013). 
142. Id. at 557; see also id. at 551 (“In 1965, the States could be divided into 
two groups: those with a recent history of voting tests and low voter 
registration and turnout, and those without those characteristics. . . . 
Today the Nation is no longer divided along those lines, yet the Voting 
Rights Act continues to treat it as if it were.”). 
143. Id. at 535. 
144. Id. at 570 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Franita Tolson, The 
Spectrum of Congressional Authority over Elections, 99 B.U. L. Rev. 
317, 392 (2019) (“The VRA is a permissible exercise of federal power, 
justifiable pursuant to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and 
the Elections Clause.”). 
145. Ari Berman, The Supreme Court’s Ideology: More Money, Less Voting, 
The Nation (Apr. 2, 2014), https://www.thenation.com/article/supreme-
courts-ideology-more-money-less-voting/ [https://perma.cc/D8E4-U62Y]. 
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direction of a new oligarchy. The lessons the Supreme Court teaches 
through those cases are that precedent matters little and that the very 
concept of constitutionality is politically pliable. 
All of these attacks on democracy have taken a toll on our 
democracy and moved us toward an oligarchy. In fact, political 
scientists concluded in 2014 that “if policymaking is dominated by 
powerful business organizations and a small number of affluent 
Americans,” as their analyses showed, “then America’s claims to being 
a democratic society are seriously threatened.”146 The political scientists 
assembled a unique database of 1,779 federal-policy cases between 1981 
and 2002 which provided data regarding surveyed citizens’ income as 
well as a host of other factors, such as clear policy outcomes.147 They 
found that after controlling for all other factors, economic elites (defined 
as those at the ninetieth percentile or above) and business-related 
special interest groups predominated in influencing policy outcomes.148 
Mass-interest groups held some sway, but only half as much as business-
oriented groups, leading the authors to find: “These business groups are 
far more numerous and active; they spend much more money; and they 
tend to get their way.”149 The study finds that the U.S. political system 
operates as a textbook example of an oligarchy: “When the preferences 
of economic elites and the stands of organized interest groups are 
controlled for, the preferences of the average American appear to have 
only a minuscule, near-zero, statistically non-significant impact upon 
public policy.”150 Many other scholars agree.151 
 
146. Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics: 
Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 Persps. on Pols. 564, 
577 (2014). 
147. Id. at 568. Gilens and Page excluded issues not committed to democratic 
negotiation, such as Supreme Court decisions or those requiring a 
Constitutional Amendment. See id. 
148. Id. at 572, 574–75. 
149. Id. at 574–75 (“The influence coefficients for both mass-based and 
business-oriented interest groups are positive . . . but the coefficient for 
business groups is nearly twice as large as that for the mass groups.”). 
150. Id. at 575. An oligarchy is a government by the few, or a small group of 
people. Oligarchy, Lexico, https://lexico.com/en/definition/oligarcy [https:// 
 perma.cc/NJQ9-HMFD] (last visited Mar. 27, 2019). 
151. E.g., Larry M. Bartels, Unequal Democracy: The Political 
Economy of the New Gilded Age 6 (2d ed. 2016) (“[T]he opinions 
of . . . ordinary citizens in the bottom one-third of the income distribution 
have no discernible impact on the behavior of their elected represen–
tatives.”); Martin Gilens, Inequality and Democratic Responsiveness, 69 
Pub. Opinion Q. 778, 794 (2005) (“[I]nfluence over actual policy outcomes 
appears to be reserved almost exclusively for those at the top of the 
income distribution.”); id. at 778 (“[R]epresentational biases of this 
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The issues of current import to these new ruling oligarchs do not 
include any efforts to breakdown the American racial hierarchy. On the 
contrary, they seem most interested in limiting government spending, 
lowering taxes, deregulating business, and restricting the influence of 
democracy.152 Their pursuit of this agenda is intimately tied to the 
preservation of the racial hierarchy that continues to fester in our 
society.153 Their reactionary agenda relies upon the perpetuation of that 
hierarchy both as a mechanism of drawing political strength from the 
animus it engenders and as a mechanism of excluding disinvited voices 
from our democracy.154 While they themselves may not act with racial 
animus, they need to engender such animus in the body politic for their 
stealth plan to impose an oligarchy to succeed.155 
As shown above, moreover, the movement does not abide by norms 
or precedent, only naked power (including the power of dog-whistle 
politics and mass voter disenfranchisement) to impose its will.156 They 
pursue their oligarchy through stealth and only minimally respect 
 
magnitude call into question the very democratic character of our 
society.”). 
152. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
153. See Haney López, supra note 48, at 221 (“[A]meliorating racial inequality 
is a precondition to ending racial politics. So long as society remains riven 
by racial divisions, racial demagoguery will remain a threat to the middle 
class.”) (emphasis omitted). Without the support of dog-whistle politics, 
the radical right in the U.S. would fail. See id. 
154. As Professor Haney López highlights, three out of ten African-American 
males will suffer disenfranchisement at some point in their lives. Id. at 
160. 
155. Professor MacLean describes the true motive of the libertarian cause: 
The libertarian cause . . . was never really about freedom . . . . It 
was about the promotion of crippling division among the people 
so as to end any interference with what those who held vast power 
over others believed should be their prerogatives. Its leaders had 
no scruples about enlisting white supremacy to achieve capital 
supremacy. 
 MacLean, supra note 30, at 234. 
156. Professor Haney López describes the practical effects of voter ID laws: 
In the wake of Obama’s 2008 election, the GOP became even more 
aggressive in seeking to disenfranchise minorities and the poor 
through various mechanisms, including restrictive voter ID laws. 
In 2011, 38 states introduced legislation likely to impede voting 
by these groups. This extraordinary number reflected a concerted 
effort on the part of some Republican officials—and their 
billionaire backers—to drive down voting by Democratic 
constituencies. 
 Haney López, supra note 48, at 160.  
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precedent or the rule of law.157 They spurn democratic negotiation in 
favor of minority rule.158 They pursue their agenda by all means 
necessary, including fabricating new-fangled legal doctrines and rever–
sing legal precedents.159 The nature of their attack on democracy knows 
little restraint.160 
 
157. See MacLean, supra note 30, at 234 (“[T]oday, knowing that the 
majority does not share their goals and would stop them if they 
understood the endgame, the team of paid operatives seeks to win by 
stealth.”).  
158. The radical right is closing in on holding a veto-proof supermajority even 
though the majority of voters do not support it. See id. at 231–32 
(describing the effect of gerrymandering on American voting). 
159. For example, in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 
310 (2010), the Roberts Court struck down the Bi-Partisan Campaign 
Finance Reform Act of 2002, and overturned two of its own precedents: 
“Today Justice Kennedy wrote for a court majority of the five 
conservative justices. He effectively wiped out a key provision of 
Congress’[s] 2002 campaign finance reform. He also did indeed strike down 
Austin and parts of McConnell.” Richard Hasen, Money Grubbers, Slate 
(Jan. 21, 2010), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2010/01/the-supreme-
court-kills-campaign-finance-reform-in-citizens-united.html [https://perma.cc/ 
 2AA7-2NB6]. 
160. For example, in Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013), the Roberts 
Court struck down legislation that passed the Senate by a vote of 98–0 
and passed the House by an overwhelming vote. Id. at 565 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). Nevertheless, according to conservative former jurist Richard 
Posner: 
The majority opinion in Shelby acknowledges that racial 
discrimination in voting continues, but notes that the situation 
has improved since 1965 and that the procedures in the current 
Voting Rights Act do not make a clean fit with the current forms 
and pattern of discrimination. Ordinarily however a federal 
statute is not invalidated on the ground that it’s dated. . . . And 
the criticisms of the statute in the majority opinion are rather 
tepid. That’s why the court’s invocation of “equal sovereignty” is 
an indispensable prop of the decision. But, as I said, there is no 
doctrine of equal sovereignty. The opinion rests on air. 
 Richard A. Posner, The Voting Rights Act Ruling is About the 
Conservative Imagination, Slate (June 26, 2013), https://slate.com/news-
and-politics/2013/06/the-supreme-court-and-the-voting-rights-act-striking-
down-the-law-is-all-about-conservatives-imagination.html [https://perma.cc/ 
 KVQ2-BLT4]. “Roberts is able to cite only the weakest support for this 
principle—a handful of very old cases that address entirely different 
matters.” Eric Posner, Supreme Court on the Voting Rights Act: Chief 
Justice John Roberts Struck Down Part of the Law for the Lamest of 
Reasons, Slate (June 25, 2013), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2013/ 
 06/supreme-court-on-the-voting-rights-act-chief-justice-john-roberts-struck-
down-part-of-the-law-for-the-lamest-of-reasons.html [https://perma.cc/ 
 S8AR-4YHE]. 
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As such, the movement to impose an oligarchy lights the way for 
the means to unwind their handiwork; democracy will be saved only by 
pursuing all paths available under law to restore democracy and to 
reverse engineer our democracy from where the oligarchs leave it today. 
That means limiting deference to traditional norms and respect of 
precedent, as the conservative majority on the Court clearly does, until 
the transcendent value of democracy is vindicated and majority rule is 
restored.161 The rule of law requires that the law secure fundamental 
rights, including the right to vote. Democracy and the rule of law enjoy 
close and mutually essential links;162 thus, defending a vibrant demo–
cracy defends the rule of law. 
 
161. See supra notes 138–140 and accompanying text. Thus, for example, a 
fair assessment of the precedential value of the “equal sovereignty” 
doctrine used to invalidate the VRA would focus on the fact that the 
doctrine finds a firmer textual foundation in the Articles of Confederation 
rather than the U.S. Constitution. Unlike the Constitution, in the Articles 
of Confederation the states retained sovereignty. The word “sovereignty” 
does not appear in the U.S. Constitution. Compare Articles of 
Confederation of 1781, art. II (“Each State retains its Sovereignty, 
freedom and independence”), with U.S. Const. See also Lepore, supra 
note 22, at 122, 290 (explaining that the Constitution did not reflect a 
confederacy of states but instead invested the people as sovereign 
directly). 
162. In a commencement address, United States Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison 
described the role of democracy: 
Our efforts to foster democracy, even in areas where it has never 
been known, is a noble effort. But it’s based on self interest. Until 
we interrupt the cycle of radicalism and repression among the 
tyrannies of the world, we will never be safe. In today’s world, our 
security depends upon the freedom of others. Democracy starts 
with voting and majority rule. But it is successful only when it 
has, at its foundation, a society that provides minority rights, 
dispenses equal justice, tolerates a free media, and operates under 
the rule of law. This concept harnesses individual rights as well as 
majority rule to the democratic process. We have grown up in the 
United States in a society of laws, not of men. We tend to take 
that concept for granted. But in most emerging democracies, the 
rule of law is an alien idea, almost incomprehensible. It is critical, 
as we promote free elections, that we also promote the rule of law 
throughout the world. 
 Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison, Commencement Address at the SMU 
Dedman School of Law (May 14, 2005), in Foreword: Democracy and the 
Rule of Law, 58 SMU L. Rev. 495, 495 (2005). In fact, every nation 
ranked at the top of the World Justice Project Rule of Law Rating 
(strongest adherence to the rule of law) is also rated as a “Full 
Democracy” by the EIU Democracy Index. Compare World Justice 
Project, supra note 3, at 20, with EIU Democracy Index, supra note 6, at 
11, 14, and 24. 
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Traditionally the U.S. has pursued that right with vigor, as the 
next part will show. Part IV seeks to prove that democratic rule plays 
a central, even paramount, role in our modern constitutional republic, 
and that minority rule simply cannot be allowed to play the 
predominant role it plays today. As such, we posit that extraordinary 
efforts to restore democracy are now justified. Part IV demonstrates 
that advocating for a democracy over an oligarchy is the apotheosis of 
our long history of struggling for democratic rule. 
III. Democracy Strikes Back 
Consider first the long-term course of the concept democracy in the 
life of our own democracy. As shown above, it defies reality to argue 
that at its incipiency the U.S. functioned as a democratic republic 
instead of an oligarchy.163 While the definition of an oligarchy turns on 
the term few, and no magic number clearly demarcates an oligarchy 
from a representative democracy, certainly a system that extends 
voting rights to only six percent of the populace and enslaves a signif–
icant percentage of its population cannot qualify as a democratic 
republic or a representative democracy.164 Then additional problems 
emerge, as discussed above, in the form of inflating the voting power of 
the slaveholders, the Electoral College, and the Senate.165 None of these 
contrivances to save slavery into the indefinite future can hide the 
essential fact that the original intent of the Founders was the imposition 
of an oligarchy, pure and simple.166 Nevertheless, since 1789 the 
 
163. See supra notes 25–27 and accompanying text. 
164. See supra notes 25–27 and accompanying text (discussing how the Founders 
established the early United States as an oligarchy rather than as a 
democratic republic). 
165. See Huskerson, supra note 25 (describing the evolution of U.S. voting 
laws). 
166. Historically, many considered the South “an aggressive slavocracy,” which 
effectively dominated the federal government until it failed to maintain 
sufficient unity of purpose and cohesion to overcome the economic and 
military superiority of the Union forces during the Civil War. See 
Chauncy S. Boucher, In re That Aggressive Slavocracy, 8 Miss. Valley 
Hist. Rev. 13, 13–15, 79 (1921). This slavocracy pulled the nation into 
the annexation of Texas as a slave state in 1845. See Joel Sibley, Storm 
Over Texas 91, 175–81 (2005). In 1860, after the election of Abraham 
Lincoln, then-President James Buchanan advised the North to amend the 
Constitution to protect slavery in all U.S. territories, submit to the 
fugitive slave law, “stop criticizing slavery,” and make Cuba a slave state. 
James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom 251 (1988). In the 
late-1850s, slave interests sought to violently expand their power 
throughout Central and South America. Lepore, supra note 22, at 281. 
Ultimately, the slavocracy’s overreach incited both Northern resistance 
and its own destruction in the Civil War. Sibley, supra. Indeed, some 
termed the South a “rabid slavocracy” in the aftermath of Lincoln’s 
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constitutional trajectory of our nation traces a path to a representative 
democracy and constantly affirms a move toward an ever-increasing 
democratic form of governance.167 
Indeed, the status of African Americans as citizens or slaves defined 
the Civil War. The pro-slavery Constitution installed in 1789 faced 
complete destruction (at least in theory) in 1865 after the South 
desperately decided to attack the federal government in a violent168 and 
futile attempt to retain indefinitely the ownership of slaves.169 After 
 
election but prior to the rebels firing on Fort Sumter. McPherson, supra, 
at 251. Ever-increasing concentrations of power prove insatiable and 
therefore tend toward self-destruction. 
167. See Alexander Keyssar, The Right to Vote 295 (rev. ed. 2009) 
(“The proportion of the adult population enfranchised is far greater than 
it was at the nation’s founding or at the end of the nineteenth century.”). 
The ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920 effectively doubled 
the electorate. Id. at 175. In 1971, the Twenty-sixth Amendment lowered 
the voting age to eighteen. Id. at 228. The Fourteenth Amendment 
introduced the right to vote into the Constitution and effectively 
guaranteed suffrage for all males by sanctioning states who denied them 
suffrage. Id. at 71–74, 82–83. The Fifteenth Amendment enfranchised 
former slaves. Id. at 74–83. This ultimately led to the Voting Rights Act 
of 1965, which empowered over one million African-American voters in 
the South. Id. at 211–13. 
168. After the election of 1860, South Carolina began its insurrection. On 
December 20 of that year, its legislature declared that “‘the Union now 
subsisting between South Carolina and other states, under the name of 
the United States of America, is hereby dissolved.’ After the declaration, 
South Carolina set about seizing forts, arsenals, and other strategic 
locations within the state.” States Meet to Form Confederacy, History, 
https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/states-meet-to-form-
confederacy (last updated July 27, 2019) [https://perma.cc/MTL2-J5Y5]. 
“On April 12, 1861, thirty-four hours of bombardment began the Civil 
War. It was the beginning of four years of terrific fighting, North versus 
South.” Where the American Civil War Began, Nat’l Park Serv. 
https://www.nps.gov/fosu/index.htm [https://perma.cc/L86V-TW8Q] 
(last updated Sept. 27, 2019). See also McPherson, supra note 166, at 
234–35, 271–74 (explaining South Carolina’s leading role in fomenting 
secession and its reasons for striking preemptively on Fort Sumter). 
169. The secession statement of South Carolina clarifies the role of slavery and 
the profoundly anti-democratic nature of the rebel cause: 
A geographical line has been drawn across the Union, and all the 
States north of that line have united in the election of a man to 
the high office of President of the United States, whose opinions 
and purposes are hostile to slavery. He is to be entrusted with the 
administration of the common Government, because he has 
declared that that “Government cannot endure permanently half 
slave, half free,” and that the public mind must rest in the belief 
that slavery is in the course of ultimate extinction. This sectional 
combination for the submersion of the Constitution, has been 
aided in some of the States by elevating to citizenship, persons 
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firing on Fort Sumter, the South failed to produce enough soldiers and 
sufficient war materiel to successfully fight the industrial North.170 
Atlanta burned, General Sherman marched to the sea, and General 
Grant accepted General Lee’s surrender at Appomattox Courthouse.171 
Arguably the South lost the war after Lee’s unsuccessful attacks upon 
the Union Army at Gettysburg.172 In any event, about 750,000 Amer–
 
who, by the supreme law of the land, are incapable of becoming 
citizens; and their votes have been used to inaugurate a new 
policy, hostile to the South, and destructive of its beliefs and 
safety. 
 Confederate States of America—Declaration of the Immediate 
Causes Which Induce and Justify the Secession of South Carolina 
from the Federal Union paras. 22–23 (Dec. 24, 1860), available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/csa_scarsec.asp [https://perma.cc/ 
 R6CL-RJVG]. Interestingly, in order to justify its secession, South 
Carolina invoked “the equal rights of the States.” See id.; see also 
McPherson, supra note 166, at 258 (noting that the Constitution of the 
Confederate States expressly protected states’ sovereignty and required 
states to protect slavery). The Confederate Constitution expressly forbade 
the Confederate Congress from restricting slavery and restricted states’ 
abilities to interfere with slavery. Conf. Const. of Mar. 1861, art. I, 
§9, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/csa_csa.asp 
[https://perma.cc/R6CL-RJVG]; id. art. IV, §§ 2, 3.  
170. McPherson, supra note 166, at 854–59 (“The North had a potential 
manpower superiority of more than three to one (counting only white 
men) and Union armed forces had an actual superiority of two to one 
during most of the war. In economic resources and logistical capacity the 
northern advantage was even greater.”) 
171. See generally id. at 752–56, 807–26, 848–50 (describing the Union and 
Confederate descent on Atlanta, Sherman’s motive for his march to the 
sea, and Grant’s invitation to Lee to surrender). The burning of Atlanta 
and the March to the Sea imposed a new level of cruelty upon civilians. 
In Atlanta, General Sherman ordered the citizens evacuated and the 
Union Army burned the vast majority of buildings. See Phil Leigh, Who 
Burned Atlanta?, N.Y. Times (Nov. 13, 2014), https://opinionator.blogs. 
 nytimes.com/2014/11/13/who-burned-atlanta/ [https://perma.cc/KU4F-
BSEH]. During the March to the Sea, Sherman’s troops pursued a “total-
war philosophy,” destroying anything of any military value and consuming 
civilian food supplies with the intent of “making Georgia howl” and 
undermining the South’s will to continue the war. McPherson, supra 
note 166, at 808–11. 
172. “The Battle of Gettysburg was a turning point in the Civil War, the 
Union victory that ended General Robert E. Lee’s second and most 
ambitious invasion of the North. Often referred to as the ‘High Water 
Mark of the Rebellion’, Gettysburg was the Civil War’s bloodiest battle 
and was also the inspiration for President Abraham Lincoln’s immortal 
‘Gettysburg Address’.” A New Birth of Freedom, Nat’l Park Serv., 
https://www.nps.gov/gett/index.htm [https://perma.cc/92HV-XUS5] 
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ican deaths ultimately changed the nature of federalism: the South did 
not retain sufficient “equal sovereignty” to secede against the wishes of 
the federal government and the North imposed the abolition of 
slavery.173 These facts are removed from mechanisms like judicial review 
or repeal and retain constitutional significance today.174 
Importantly, in the wake of the North’s triumph, the U.S. 
Constitution evolved in a fundamentally democratic manner.175 The 
Fifteenth Amendment provides: 
Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall 
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State 
on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. 
Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article 
by appropriate legislation.176  
After the Civil War, former slaves could vote,177 at least for a 
time.178 This certainly does not reflect the operation of any “equal 
 
(last updated Oct. 2, 2019). See also Lepore, supra note 22, at 294 
(describing the thousands of photographs taken of post-battle carnage). 
173. New research indicates the Civil War resulted in more casualties than 
previously estimated: 
For 110 years, the numbers stood as gospel: 618,222 men died in 
the Civil War, 360,222 from the North and 258,000 from the 
South—by far the greatest toll of any war in American history. 
But new research shows that the numbers were far too low. By 
combing through newly digitized census data from the 19th 
century, J. David Hacker, a demographic historian from 
Binghamton University in New York, has recalculated the death 
toll and increased it by more than 20 percent—to 750,000. 
 Guy Gugliotta, New Estimate Raises Civil War Death Toll, N.Y. Times 
(Apr. 2, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/03/science/civil-war-
toll-up-by-20-percent-in-new-estimate.html [https://perma.cc/K7FD-JWJK]. 
174. See Lepore, supra note 22, at 293 (“The Civil War . . . was vast and 
long, four brutal, wretched years of misery on a scale never before seen.”). 
175. The states ratified the Fifteenth amendment in 1870. 15th Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution: Voting Rights (1870), Nat’l Archives, https:// 
 www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=44 [https://perma.cc/ 
 YGC4-A9ZG] (last visited Apr. 2, 2019). 
176. U.S. Const. amend. XV. 
177. The Supreme Court enforced the Fifteenth Amendment to prohibit 
“grandfather tests” for voting rights. Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 
347 (1915). 
178. After the election of 1876, the Republicans withdrew their support from 
Reconstruction efforts and the Democrats used violence and terrorism to 
restore white supremacy. Derrick Bell, Race, Racism and American 
Law § 2.8 (2008). See also Richard White, The Republic for Which 
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sovereignty” and instead only occurred as a result of a protracted 
violent struggle in which the South could not match the industrial 
North.179 Today, it defies history to circumscribe federal power and 
democratically negotiated outcomes to restore antebellum180 notions of 
sovereignty and the slavocracy that spawned such notions.181 
The next major expansion of voting rights occurred in the 
aftermath of World War I. World War I itself drew the U.S. in to “make 
the world safe for democracy.”182 In fact, President Wilson refused to 
even negotiate with Germany so long as the Hohenzollern monarchy 
remained;183 he would only deal with democratic representatives of 
 
It Stands 332 (2017) (stating that after the hotly disputed election of 
1876, a compromise meant that “Hayes would not enforce the civil rights 
laws in the South; he would not deploy federal troops”). “Political equality 
had been possible, in the South, only at the barrel of a gun. As soon as 
federal troops withdrew . . . [t]he Klan terrorized the countryside, burning 
homes and hunting, torturing, and killing people.” Lepore, supra note 
22, at 330. 
179. McPherson, supra note 166, at 854–59. 
180. In 1845, the Court held: 
First, [t]he shores of navigable waters, and the soils under them, 
were not granted by the Constitution to the United States, but 
were reserved to the states respectively. Secondly, [t]he new states 
have the same rights, sovereignty, and jurisdiction over this 
subject as the original states. Thirdly, [t]he right of the United 
States to the public lands, and the power of Congress to make all 
needful rules and regulations for the sale and disposition thereof, 
conferred no power to grant to the plaintiffs the land in 
controversy in this case. 
 Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 230 (1845). 
181. See Boucher, supra note 166. 
182. President Wilson stated our war aims to Congress: 
The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be 
planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty. We have 
no selfish ends to serve. We desire no conquest, no dominion. We 
seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensation for 
the sacrifices we shall freely make. We are but one of the 
champions of the rights of mankind. We shall be satisfied when 
those rights have been made as secure as the faith and the freedom 
of nations can make them. 
 President Woodrow Wilson, Joint Address to Congress Leading to a 
Declaration of War Against Germany (Apr. 2, 1917), available at Woodrow 
Wilson’s War Message, Digital History, http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/ 
 disp_textbook.cfm?smtID=3&psid=1406 [https://perma.cc/Y394-9GYE] 
(last visited Apr. 3, 2019). 
183. A.C. Umbreit, The Peace Notes: The Armistice: The Surrender, 3 Marq. 
L. Rev. 3, 5 (1918). At the conclusion of the war, much optimism 
surrounded the opportunity to democratize the world: 
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Germany.184 This effectively ended the German monarchy and put 
Germany on its (torturous) path towards the democratic governance it 
enjoys today.185 World War I therefore illustrates the core cultural value 
of democracy in America, evinced by America’s increased dedication to 
the cause by sending as much as 250,000 fresh U.S. troops to France 
per month in 1918.186 Ultimately, U.S. military might ended the most 
durable monarchies in Europe, as the Hapsburgs and Hohenzollern 
dynasties followed the Romanovs to extinction.187 
Back home, World War I profoundly remade America. “The long 
fight to secure voting rights for women . . . reached its climax during 
the war and largely because of it.”188 Wilson decided in January 1918—
at the same time he urged self-determination and democracy 
abroad189—that he would change his previous opposition and support a 
constitutional amendment to give women the right to vote.190 Wilson 
claimed that this would support the war effort; indeed, that it was “just 
and necessary.”191 On June 28, 1919, the warring powers signed the 
 
[T]he task of teaching all these nations, large and small, the ways 
of democracy, rests upon us alone, and if we should fail, then 
democracy again will become a dream. While the war against 
autocratic militarism is over, the contest to make democracy safe 
and workable has but just begun. 
 Id. at 14. While monarchies vanished from the scene insofar as the great 
powers were concerned, the horrors of militarism reemerged a scant 
twenty years later with the onset of World War II. 
184. Thomas A. Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace 36 
(1944) (noting President Wilson’s refusal to deal with “the military 
masters of the monarchial autocrats” and instead demanding 
unconditional surrender if Kaiser Wilhelm remained in power). 
185. Id. at 36–39. Wilson pursued democracy abroad for white Europeans, but 
he pursued segregation at home and did nothing to resist Jim Crow laws. 
See Jim Lehr, The Racist Legacy of Woodrow Wilson, Atlantic (Nov. 
27, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/11/wilson-
legacy-racism/417549/ [https://perma.cc/7E6Q-EQ9L]. 
186. G.J. Meyer, A World Undone: The Story of the Great War 677 
(2006). 
187. G.J. Meyer, The World Remade: America in World War I 470, 
571 (2016). 
188. Id. at 337. 
189. Id. at 375 (recounting Wilson’s Fourteen Points speech to Congress to 
justify the conscription and transit of three million U.S. troops to Europe). 
190. Id. at 339, 343. 
191. Id. at 343. World War I highlighted the contributions and sacrifices 
women made to the war effort; and women’s voting rights raised the 
possibility that full civic participation of women could avert the horrors 
of war. As President Wilson stated to the Senate in support of a 
constitutional amendment securing the vote for women: “I regard the 
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Versailles Treaty ending both World War I and the plague of the 
monarchies.192 On June 4, 1919, Congress passed the Nineteenth 
Amendment, which was ratified the following year.193 It provides: “The 
right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or 
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex. 
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legis–
lation.”194 Once again, America paid in blood for expanded demo–
cracy.195 Axiomatically, the Nineteenth Amendment doubled voting 
rights in America.196 
The next great leap in voting rights occurred as a result of the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965.197 “The veterans of World War II and the 
Korean War became the foot soldiers of the civil rights movement in 
the 1950s and 1960s.”198 These foot soldiers marched in Selma, Alabama 
for the right to vote, leading directly to passage of the VRA in August 
1965.199 Fighting for freedom in Europe and Asia led directly to the 
 
concurrence of the Senate in the constitutional amendment proposing the 
extension of the suffrage to women as vitally essential to the successful 
prosecution of the great war of humanity in which we are engaged.” 
President Woodrow Wilson, Equal Suffrage, Address of the President of 
the United States to the Senate (Sept. 30, 1918), available at https://www. 
 senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/image/WilsonSpeech1918.htm 
[https://perma.cc/XY4X-GQ3H]. 
192. Bailey, supra note 184, at 302. 
193. 19th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: Women’s Right to Vote (1920), 
Nat’l Archives, https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false& 
 doc=63 [https://perma.cc/9TDJ-HZWC] (last visited Apr. 3, 2019). 
194. U.S. Const. amend. XIX. 
195. See Carol R. Byerly, War Losses (USA), Int’l Encyclopedia of 
World War I, https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/war_ 
 losses_usa [https://perma.cc/CLF5-E53M] (last updated Jan. 8, 2017) 
(“American losses in World War I were modest compared to those of other 
belligerents, with 116,516 deaths and approximately 320,000 sick and 
wounded of the 4.7 million men who served.”).  
196. Lepore, supra note 22, at 402. 
197. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 52 U.S.C.). The Act addressed the widespread failure of the 
Fifteenth Amendment to successfully secure the voting rights of African 
Americans and other minorities. Bell, supra note 178, §§ 6.1–6.7. 
198. Maria Höhn, African-American GIs of WWII: Fighting for Democracy 
Abroad and at Home, The Conversation (Feb. 9, 2017, 11:06 PM), 
http://theconversation.com/african-american-gis-of-wwii-fighting-for-
democracy-abroad-and-at-home-71780 [https://perma.cc/UB9P-QT9L]. 
199. Lepore, supra note 22, at 620–23. The televised violence of Alabama 
State Troopers “cracking the skulls” of non-violent protesters on the 
Pettus Bridge moved President Lyndon Johnson and the nation to action. 
Id. at 622. 
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fight for civil rights at home. Over one million African Americans served 
in World War II to protect the civil rights that they themselves were 
not yet able to enjoy.200 Many more also fought in Korea during the 
Cold War.201 Service in the war effort emboldened African American 
resistance to continued white supremacy at home.202 In the meantime, 
the racist ideology of Nazi Germany fell into grave disrepute and the 
Cold War created an imperative for the U.S. to stand for freedom not 
just for whites but for people of all colors worldwide.203  
The VRA operated as the “most successful”204 civil-rights act in 
history for forty-seven years before Chief Justice Roberts articulated a 
new-fangled theory of “equal sovereignty.”205 As astute commentators 
recognize: 
The impact of the 1965 Act was immediate and dramatic. By 
1968, more than one million new Black voters were registered, a 
figure that included more than 50 percent of the Black voting-age 
population in every southern state. The most dramatic immediate 
change occurred in Alabama, where the percentage of Black 
Americans registered to vote rose from 11 percent in 1956 to 51.2 
percent in 1966.  
Over the longer term, the Act delivered impressive (though not 
perfect) results as the number of registered Black voters 
continued to climb and the historic gaps between Black and 
White registration rates narrowed. In addition, there was 
significant growth in the number of Black elected officials. Most 
 
200. Höhn, supra note 198. 
201. Id. 
202. James T. Patterson, Grand Expectations 19–31 (1997) (“World 
War II seemed like a turning point in the nation’s quest for greater ethnic 
acculturation and racial equality.”). 
203. Keyssar, supra note 167, at 195–204 (tracing the impact of World War 
II and the Cold War on minorities’ voting rights); Derrick Bell, Brown v. 
Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 Harv. L. 
Rev. 518, 524–25 (1980) (stating that “the decision helped to provide 
immediate credibility to America’s struggle with Communist countries to 
win the hearts and minds of emerging third world peoples” and that 
“Brown offered much needed reassurance to American blacks that the 
precepts of equality and freedom so heralded during World War II might 
yet be given meaning at home”). 
204. “The Voting Rights Act of 1965 is the most successful civil rights law in 
the history of the United States.” Jason Mazzone & Stephen Rushin, 
From Selma to Ferguson: The Voting Rights Act as a Blueprint for Police 
Reform, 105 Calif. L. Rev. 263, 294 & n.196 (2017). In Mississippi, 
African-American registration soared from ten percent to almost sixty 
percent in four years from 1964 to 1968. Keyssar, supra note 167, at 212. 
205. See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 544 (2013). 
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notably, by the time the Supreme Court heard Shelby County v. 
Holder, “African-American voter turnout ha[d] come to exceed 
White voter turnout in five of the six States originally covered by 
Section 5, with a gap in the sixth State of less than one half of 
one percent.”206  
Scholars link the gains in African-Americans’ civil rights (including 
voting rights) in the mid-1960s to their willingness to enlist in the 
Vietnam War.207 Clearly, the VRA formed the cornerstone of a long-
term effort to grant basic civil rights to African Americans, and the 
minority rule imposed to overturn it lacks any semblance of legitimacy 
beyond raw political power buttressed by yesteryear’s slavocracy.208 
Like the expansion of voting rights generally, the next great 
expansion of voting power occurred in the wake of a bloody conflict—
the Vietnam War.209 The Twenty-sixth Amendment provides: 
Section. 1. The right of citizens of the United States, who are 
eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or 
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of age. 
Section. 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article 
by appropriate legislation.210  
The Twenty-sixth Amendment was ratified by the states on July 
1, 1971,211 as the country found itself embroiled in a conflict that 
necessitated transporting hundreds of thousands of young men to the 
jungles of Southeast Asia.212 As Dwight Eisenhower put it, the basic 
 
206. Mazzone & Rushin, supra note 204, at 294 (alteration in original) 
(citations omitted). 
207. See Patterson, supra note 202, at 617; see also Daniel S. Lucks, Selma 
to Saigon: The Civil Rights Movement and the Vietnam War 133–
40 (2014) (linking disproportionate African-American enlistment to civil-
rights gains and the fact that military service fueled further advancement). 
208. See sources cited supra notes 138, 160, 161, and 180. 
209. Keyssar, supra note 167, at 226–28 (discussing the critical influence of 
Vietnam, as well as the Cold War and World War II, on both the 
enactment of the Twenty-sixth Amendment and in fueling a vast increase 
in voting rights in the 1960s and 1970s). 
210. U.S. Const. amend. XXVI. 
211. See Historical Highlights: The 26th Amendment, U.S. House of 
Representatives: History, Art & Archives, https://history.house.gov/ 
 HistoricalHighlight/Detail/37022 [https://perma.cc/5EMB-PSJC] (last 
visited Nov. 20, 2019).  
212. By 1971, hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops had served in Vietnam. 
Vietnam War Allied Troop Levels 1960–73, Am. War Libr. (Dec. 6, 
2008), https://www.americanwarlibrary.com/vietnam/vwatl.htm [https:// 
 perma.cc/742Z-QKYF]. 
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argument in favor of expanded voting rights for youths came down to 
this: “If a man is old enough to fight he is old enough to vote.”213 Once 
again, expanded voting rights occurred due to a war. 
Amending the U.S. Constitution requires overwhelming political 
consensus.214 The Constitution has only been amended to expand voting 
rights and democracy and, repeatedly, to empower Congress to protect 
voting rights from denial or abridgement.215 This expansion of voting 
power is closely associated with the sacrifices of war—including sacri–
fices paid in blood.216 At the constitutional level, this expansion of 
democracy is a one-way street.217 Thus, the value of securing democracy 
cannot be overstated; it is a core American value vindicated generation 
after generation.218 This value should fuel hope and aggressive action to 
 
213. Pamela S. Karlan, Ballots and Bullets: The Exceptional History of the 
Right to Vote, 71 Cin. L. Rev. 1345, 1358–59 (2003). The plain meaning 
of the Amendment prohibits all age discrimination denying or abridging 
voting rights, a point we return to in the next part of the Article. See Eric 
S. Fish, The Twenty-Sixth Amendment Enforcement Power, 121 Yale L. 
J. 1168, 1174–77 (2012). 
214. U.S. Const. art. V. 
215. See sources cited supra notes 176, 194, and 210. 
216. As President Lyndon Johnson stated to a joint session of Congress in 
1965: 
This was the first nation in the history of the world to be founded 
with a purpose. The great phrases of that purpose still sound in 
every American heart, North and South: “All men are created 
equal,” “government by consent of the governed,” “give me liberty 
or give me death.” Well, those are not just clever words, or those 
are not just empty theories. In their name Americans have fought 
and died for two centuries, and tonight around the world they 
stand there as guardians of our liberty, risking their lives. 
 President Lyndon B. Johnson, Address to a Joint Session of Congress on 
Voting Legislation (Mar. 15, 1965), available at American Rhetoric: Top 
100 Speeches, Am. Rhetoric https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/ 
 lbjweshallovercome.htm [https://perma.cc/XD2D-LBWZ] (last updated 
May 22, 2018). “[T]he most prominent peaks in the history of the franchise 
in the United States were the Revolutionary War, the Civil War, World 
Wars I and II, and the first decades of the cold war. Each of these conflicts 
contributed significantly to the broadening of the right to vote.” 
Keyssar, supra note 167, at 296. 
217. No constitutional amendment has ever circumscribed voting or citizens’ 
democratic voice. See generally U.S. Const. 
218. Keyssar, supra note 167, at xix (“According to our national self-image—
an image etched in popular culture and buttressed by scholarly inquiry—
the United States has been the pioneer of republican and then democratic 
reforms for two hundred years, the standard bearer of democratic values 
on the stage of world history.”). 
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defeat the stealth efforts to reimpose an American oligarchy by all 
means necessary under the law. 
Recently, hope has emerged from Florida. On November 6, 2018, 
the citizens of Florida voted to pass the Voting Restoration 
Amendment (“Amendment 4”), a measure that held favor with sixty-
five percent of voters.219 Amendment 4, as it stands, restores voting 
rights to over 1.4 million convicted felons—the largest voter expansion 
since the Twenty-sixth Amendment.220 The terms of Amendment 4 
restore voting rights to convicted felons who have “completed their 
prison term, parole and probation, except those with murder or felony 
sexual-assault convictions.”221 While some backtracking may occur, the 
fact remains that a powerful majority of a large, diverse, and critical 
swing state voted to expand democracy.222 
Felony enfranchisement could well create the next great expansion 
in voter eligibility. The vote in Florida mirrors nationwide support for 
halting felony disenfranchisement.223 Felony disenfranchisement 
disproportionately affects African Americans, as intended in the post-
Civil War South where many such laws find their roots.224 Currently, 
 
219. Jessica Weiss, When Will Amendment 4 Be Implemented?, WRLN (Dec. 14, 
2018), https://www.wlrn.org/post/when-will-amendment-4-be-implemented 
[https://perma.cc/JM6Y-9GDD]. 
220. Jon Kamp & Arian Campo-Flores, Florida to Gain 1.4 Million Voters if 
Felon Measure Passes, Wall St. J. (Oct. 30, 2018, 5:42 AM), https:// 
 www.wsj.com/articles/florida-to-gain-1-4-million-voters-if-felon-measure-
passes-1540891801 [https://perma.cc/26Z3-4CD3]. 
221. Id. 
222. Lawrence Mower, Paying Restitution Fully Is a Huge Complication for 
the Intent of Amendment 4, Miami Herald (Apr. 4, 2019, 10:00 AM), 
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics-government/state-politics/ 
 article228821704.html [https://perma.cc/2ALT-Z2WH] (“Republican 
lawmakers and some key supporters of Amendment 4 believe sentences 
include restitution. Others disagree.”). The GOP will continue its war on 
democracy by all means necessary with respect to all expansions of voting 
rights, particularly voting rights for people of color, which plays a key role 
in justifying legal counterattacks. See David Leonhardt, G.O.P. vs. Voting 
Rights (Yes, Again), N.Y. Times (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
 2019/04/09/opinion/florida-felons-vote-amendment-4.html [https://perma. 
 cc/Z3LU-RB2W]. 
223. Sam Levine & Ariel Edwards-Levy, Most Americans Favor Restoring 
Felons’ Voting Rights, But Disagree On How, Huffington Post (Mar. 
21, 2018, 6:56 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/felons-voting-rights-
poll_n_5ab2c153e4b008c9e5f3c88a [https://perma.cc/2ALT-Z2WH]. 
224. Id.; see also Angela Behrens et al., Ballot Manipulation and the “Menace 
of Negro Domination”: Racial Threat and Felon Disenfranchisement in 
the United States, 1850-2002, 109 Am. J. Soc. 559, 598 (2003) (finding 
that after the Civil War “felon disenfranchisement laws offered one 
method for states to avert ‘the menace of negro domination.’”). 
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about 6.1 million felons cannot vote due to felony disenfranchisement 
laws across the U.S.225 This defies the general trend of American history, 
shown above, toward greater franchise rights.226 In fact, in 1788, less 
than two percent of the population voted for president.227 Today, about 
forty or forty-five percent of the population votes for president.228 The 
percentage of Americans voting for president has increased by a factor 
of twenty since the incipiency of our republic.229 
That is the central point here. The constitutional trajectory of 
democratic governance moves only in the direction of greater majority 
rule, despite its admittedly oligarchic beginning.230 The core value of 
ever-increasing democracy arises very often either from a contract with 
those asked to make the ultimate sacrifice in wartime or from the 
consecration of war.231 Indeed, the U.S. traditionally operated as an 
 
225. Karin Kamp, Voting By the Numbers: Americans and Election Day, 
Moyers & Company (Nov. 8, 2016), https://billmoyers.com/story/ 
 numbers-americans-election-day-voting/ [https://perma.cc/T3FU-UBJK]. 
According to one observer, the major spikes in voting rights arose from 
the earliest decades of the republic: 
As different segments of the American population gained the right 
to vote throughout our history, the percentage of voters as 
compared to population increased. The first surge came in 1828, 
when non-property-owning white men gained the right to vote. 
Then we see another surge, when women got the right to vote in 
1920. 
 Id. 
226. See supra Part IV.  
227. Kamp, supra note 225.  
228. Id. 
229. Id. 
230. See generally Keyssar, supra note 167 at 295–98 (tracing the expansion 
of voting rights throughout U.S. history). 
231. As Professor Karlan explains: 
[T]he history of voting rights in America has been an admirable 
one. Far from being “almost bloodless, almost completely peaceful, 
and astonishingly easy,” the struggle for voting rights has in fact 
been none of those things. The most significant developments—
from the enactment of the Reconstruction, Nineteenth, and 
Twenty-Sixth Amendments to the abandonment of wealth 
qualifications—were either directly or indirectly the product of 
wars. Sometimes, war has emboldened previously excluded groups 
to demand their right to full citizenship; sometimes, war has 
brought home to the rest of the nation the injustice of asking 
people to fight on behalf of a government that excludes them. As 
much as our military engagements have focused on making the 
rest of world safe for democracy, they have often been as valuable 
in helping to achieve democracy at home. 
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international force for democracy as a means of stabilizing the global 
political order and securing peace.232 Moreover, democratic rule forms 
an essential element of the rule of law233 and should certainly warrant 
protection as a fundamental right under American law.234 Consequently, 
based upon these realities, we advocate that the law restructure our 
electoral processes to maximize democratic influence by all means 
necessary.235 The next section expands on the meaning of that term for 
purposes of our democracy in the current era.  
IV. Reforming Democracy 
Congress holds the power to regulate and restructure our 
democracy. For example, Article I, section 4 of the Constitution 
provides: “Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and 
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature 
 
 Karlan, supra note 213, at 1371 (footnotes omitted). 
232. Larry Diamond, Ill Winds: Saving Democracy from Russian Rage, 
Chinese Ambition, and American Complacency 41–43 (2019). 
Unfortunately, the “steady decline in the quality of American democracy” 
contributed to a decline of democratic freedom worldwide after 2006, in 
favor of a more autocratic vision of governance proffered by China and 
Russia, “which are avidly undermining democratic and liberal values 
around the world.” Larry Diamond, The Global Crisis of Democracy, 
Wall St. J. (May 18, 2019, 2:26 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
 the-global-crisis-of-democracy-11558105463 [https://perma.cc/C47K-PL7D]. 
233. See sources cited supra note 162. 
234. Joshua A. Douglas, Is the Right to Vote Really Fundamental?, 18 
Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 143, 176–86 (2008). Douglas summarizes 
as follows: 
Most Americans believe that they have a voice in their democracy 
because they can exercise that right. Every four years, advocacy 
groups urge citizens to vote in that year’s presidential election. 
We fight wars overseas in part to help people in foreign countries 
achieve the freedom that comes with the ability to cast a ballot. 
In short, the right to vote is part of our ethos for what it means 
to be an American. The problem, however, is that our legal system 
has not always given an individual’s right to vote the same 
venerated status as it has given many other important rights. 
Although the right to vote is considered a “fundamental” right, 
courts often treat the right to vote as less than fundamental by 
employing a low level of scrutiny to election law challenges. 
 Id. at 145 (footnotes omitted). 
235. Americans will generally support all such efforts. About fifty-five percent 
believe our democracy is “weak” and sixty-eight percent think it is 
“weakening.” Democracy Project, supra note 6, at 4–5. Moreover, sixty 
percent of Americans rate democracy as “absolutely important” and an 
additional seventeen percent rate it as “very important.” Id. at 3. 
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thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such 
Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.”236 In Arizona 
v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc.,237 the Court read congressional 
authority under the Elections Clause broadly, explaining that: 
Because the power the Elections Clause confers is none other than 
the power to pre-empt, the reasonable assumption is that the 
statutory text accurately communicates the scope of Congress’s 
pre-emptive intent. Moreover, the federalism concerns underlying 
the presumption in the Supremacy Clause context are somewhat 
weaker here. Unlike the States’ “historic police powers,” the 
States’ role in regulating congressional elections—while weighty 
and worthy of respect—has always existed subject to the express 
qualification that it “terminates according to federal law.” In sum, 
there is no compelling reason not to read Elections Clause 
legislation simply to mean what it says.238  
The passage of the Seventeenth Amendment, which provided for 
the direct, popular election of Senators instead of their selection by 
state legislatures, rendered moot the one limitation on Congress’s power 
under the Elections Clause; that is, when it comes to elections for both 
houses of Congress, Congress has broad power to regulate those 
elections.239 
Congress enjoys additional power under multiple other 
constitutional provisions relating to elections.240 Most importantly, the 
Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Nineteenth and Twenty-sixth Amendments each 
empowers Congress to enforce the expanded franchise rights those 
Amendments provide and to protect such voting rights from being 
“denied or abridged.”241 Because of the overlapping and multiple grants 
of authority to Congress to secure federal elections, scholars posit that 
“federal power is at its highest ebb when Congress seeks to regulate 
federal elections.”242 Further, “federalism is not a barrier to aggressive 
 
236. U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
237. 570 U.S. 1 (2013). 
238. Id. at 14–15 (citations omitted) (first quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator 
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); then quoting Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ 
Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 347 (2001)). 
239. Id. at 16–17; see also U.S. Const. amend. XVII (changing the place of 
Senate selections away from State legislatures). 
240. See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. I, §§ 2, 4–5; id. art. II, § 1; id. art. IV, § 4; id. 
amends. XXII, XIV, XV, XVII, XIX, XXIII, XXIV, XXVI. 
241. Id. amend. XIV, § 5; id. amend. XV, § 2; id. amend. XIX; id. amend. 
XXVI, § 2. 
242. Tolson, supra note 144, at 322. Professor Tolson continues: 
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federal action under the Elections Clause seeking to protect the 
fundamental right to vote” because these Amendments commit the 
federal government to guard the expanded democracy that the 
Amendments envision.243 
Congress should use this power to immediately reverse felony 
disenfranchisement nationwide. Scholars find the laws closely associated 
with the maintenance of racial hierarchy: 
The expansion of citizenship to racial minorities, and the 
subsequent extension of suffrage to all citizens, threatened to 
undermine the political power of the white majority. By 
restricting the voting rights of a disproportionately nonwhite 
population, felon disenfranchisement laws offered one method for 
states to avert “the menace of negro domination.” The sharp 
increase in African-American imprisonment goes hand-in-hand 
with changes in voting laws. In many Southern states, the 
percentage of nonwhite prison inmates nearly doubled between 
1850 and 1870. Whereas 2% of the Alabama prison population 
was nonwhite in 1850, 74% was nonwhite in 1870, though the 
total nonwhite population increased by only 3%. Felon 
disenfranchisement provisions offered a tangible response to the 
threat of new African-American voters that would help preserve 
existing racial hierarchies.244  
Reversing felony-disenfranchisement laws would not violate any 
new legal doctrines like “equal sovereignty” because the laws would not 
be limited to the South.245 Indeed, it is challenging to find non-
 
From this perspective, the sin of Shelby County is not only the 
neutering of a significant provision of one of the most successful 
civil rights statutes in history, but also that it leaves a legacy of 
constitutional interpretation ignorant of the full spectrum of 
congressional authority in this area. The Court focused on the 
substantial federalism costs of the VRA, ignoring that the Act 
arguably could have been sustained based on some combination 
of the Elections Clause and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments. 
 Id. at 323 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 89-439, at 6 (1965) (“The bill, as 
amended, is designed primarily to enforce the 15th amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States and is also designed to enforce the 14th 
amendment and article I, section 4.”)). 
243. Id. at 321–22. 
244. Behrens et al., supra note 224, at 598 (citations omitted). 
245. Id. (“As in the South, new Western states struggled to sustain control 
‘under conditions of full democratization’ and a changing industrial and 
agricultural economy. Racial and ethnic divisions thus led to similar 
attempts to limit suffrage of the non-white population . . . .”) (citations 
omitted).  
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 1·2019 
Deracialization and Democracy 
128 
discriminatory reasons for these laws.246 The fact that these laws mimic 
the operation of the “three-fifths a man” rule compounds the laws’ 
odiousness because ineligible prisoners inflate the voting power of rural 
districts where prisons are typically found while denying those prisoners 
the right to vote.247 Repeal of all felony disenfranchisement rests clearly 
within the powers of Congress to protect voting rights and democracy. 
Another means of expanding democracy to meet the threat of an 
oligarchy entails granting statehood to Puerto Rico and the District of 
Columbia. The Constitution grants this power to Congress.248 It is 
impossible to defend the non-voting status of the U.S. citizens currently 
residing in Puerto Rico.249 This summarizes the bizarre status of our co-
citizens in Puerto Rico: 
Though Puerto Rico nationals are U.S. citizens and they send a 
non-voting resident commissioner to the U.S. House of Represen–
tatives, they are prohibited from voting in presidential elections. 
 
246. Id. (“Our results suggest that one of the reasons that felon 
disenfranchisement laws persist may be their compatibility with modern 
racial ideologies. The laws are race neutral on their face, though their 
origins are tainted by strategies of racial containment.”); see also Hunter 
v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1981) (holding that Alabama’s constitutional 
provision disenfranchising felons violated the Fourteenth Amendment). 
247. As one practitioner notes:  
In forty-four states, prisoners are treated as residents of their 
prison cell for the purposes of creating electoral districts, although 
they themselves cannot vote, and are likely to return to their home 
community after serving their term of incarceration. Those sent 
to prison are disproportionately people of color and disproport–
ionately come from urban areas. Prisons, however, are increasingly 
located in more rural areas, among disproportionately white, more 
conservative populations. 
 Julie A. Ebenstein, The Geography of Mass Incarceration: Prison 
Gerrymandering and the Dilution of Prisoners’ Political Representation, 
45 Fordham Urb. L.J. 323, 371 (2018) (footnotes omitted). 
248. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3 (“New States may be admitted by the Congress 
into this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the 
Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction 
of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the 
Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.”). 
249. Colonial rule of U.S. citizens can only be termed “a historic injustice,” 
starkly inconsistent with the nation’s history of expanding democracy. See 
Camilo Montoua-Galvez & David Begnaud, Lawmakers Introduce Puerto 
Rico Statehood Bill: “It’s Time to End 120 Years of Colonialism,” CBS News 
(Mar. 28, 2019, 11:27 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/statehood-
for-puerto-rico-lawmakers-to-introduce-bill-granting-puerto-rico-statehood-
bypassing-any-referendum/ [https://perma.cc/7BAU-TTA4]. 
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However, Puerto Rican nationals can cast ballots in the Democ–
ratic and Republican nominating contests for the White House.250  
The current policy of colonial rule in Puerto Rico leaves 3.2 million 
Americans disenfranchised.251 With respect to the District of Colombia, 
the Washington Post states, bluntly: 
Another bill . . . has been introduced . . . that would make D.C. 
the nation’s 51st state . . . . It is wrong that the more than 700,000 
people who live in the District, paying taxes and fulfilling all the 
other obligations of citizenship (including going to war), are 
denied a voice in Congress. It is time for them to be heard.252  
In all, four million U.S. citizens simply do not count in American 
democracy because they happen to live in Washington, D.C., or Puerto 
Rico.253 
Reforming the Senate itself presents more difficulty.254 After all, 
Article V specifies that “no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived 
of its equal Suffrage in the Senate” through any constitutional 
amendment.255 The current system deprives both states and individuals 
of any notion of “equal suffrage” in the Senate: “today a voter in the 
state with the lowest population—Wyoming, with 573,000 people—has 
 
250. Amanda Becker, Puerto Rico Governor says 2020 Democrats Must 
Support Statehood, Reuters (Feb. 22, 2019, 2:14 PM), https://www.reuters 
 .com/article/us-usa-election-puertorico/puerto-rico-governor-says-2020-
democrats-must-support-statehood-idUSKCN1QB2A4 
[https://perma.cc/9WYN-WS3F]. 
251. See Montoua-Galvez & Begnaud, supra note 249; see also José A. 
Cabranes, Puerto Rico: Colonialism as Constitutional Doctrine, 100 Harv. 
L. Rev. 450, 461 (1986) (reviewing Juan R. Torruella, The Supreme 
Court and Puerto Rico: The Doctrine of Separate and Unequal 
(1985) (“Puerto Rico is still not a part of the ‘United States’ for all 
constitutional purposes; the island and its people are still subject to the 
laws and regulations adopted by the political branches of the national 
government before which they appear only as supplicants . . . .”)). 
252. The House Finally Voted to Support D.C. Statehood. It’s a Needed Step., 
Wash. Post (Mar. 12, 2019, 7:11 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
 opinions/the-house-finally-voted-to-support-dc-statehood-its-a-needed-step/ 
 2019/03/12/f171771c-4434-11e9-8aab-95b8d80a1e4f_story.html?utm_term= 
 .d46d72b134b7 [https://perma.cc/7DFF-SPPD]. 
253. In both Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia, strong citizen 
majorities favor statehood. See Mehdi Hasan, Eight Simple Steps to Fix 
American Democracy, NewStatesmanAmerica (Nov. 1, 2019), https:// 
 www.newstatesman.com/world/north-america/2018/11/eight-simple-steps-
fix-american-democracy [https://perma.cc/46SF-Z3QM]. 
254. If the Senate can become more democratically constituted then the 
electoral college will follow. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 1. 
255. U.S. Const. art. V. 
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approximately 70 times the influence in the Senate as a voter in the 
largest state, California, where the population is 39.5 million.”256 This 
plainly abridges and dilutes the votes of women and minorities in highly 
populated states.257 The political scientist David Birdsell calculates that 
by 2040, seventy percent of U.S. citizens will reside in fifteen states 
with thirty Senators; on the other hand, thirty percent of the population 
will reside in thirty-five states with seventy Senators.258 
Professor Eric Orts argues that Congress holds the power to alter 
the current convention of limiting states to two senators.259 He finds 
this power in the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-fourth and 
Twenty-sixth Amendments, which he argues give Congress broad power 
to protect voting rights from being “denied or abridged.”260 The 
Constitution requires only that the Senate “be composed”261 of two 
senators per state; if the Senate also consisted of an overlay of 
proportional representation based upon population, as Orts suggests, 
the Constitution as a whole would be harmonized in a pro-democracy 
direction.262 We argue, in short, that the Senate “be composed” of two 
Senators per state, and be further composed of additional Senators 
based upon state population to vindicate every State’s right to equal 
suffrage in the senate. 
 
256. Stephen Mihm, Why Power in the Senate Is Increasingly Imbalanced, 
Bloomberg (Feb. 8, 2019, 8:30 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/ 
 articles/2019-02-08/senate-power-imbalance-tilts-toward-least-populous-
states [https://perma.cc/GB88-GBWA]. 
257. See Philip Bump, By 2040, Two-thirds of Americans Will Be Represented 
by 30 Percent of the Senate, Wash. Post (Nov. 28, 2017, 12:23 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2017/11/28/by-2040-
two-thirds-of-americans-will-be-represented-by-30-percent-of-the-senate/?utm 
 _term=.81010530283f [https://perma.cc/BD48-V3PR] (“Population 
projections from the University of Virginia’s Weldon Cooper Center for 
Public Service offer a slightly lower distribution: By 2040, the 15 most 
populous states will be home to 67 percent of the U.S. population and 
represented by 30 percent of the Senate.”). 
258. Id. 
259. Eric W. Orts, The Path to Give California 12 Senators, and Vermont Just 
One, Atlantic (Jan. 2, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/ 
 2019/01/heres-how-fix-senate/579172/ [https://perma.cc/A2MG-TZQC]. 
260. Id. 
261. U.S. Const. art. I, § 3. 
262. Much turns on the meaning of the word composed. See, e.g., Compose, 
Webster’s New Universal Unabridged Dictionary 419 (1996) 
(defining “compose” primarily to mean “to make or form by combining 
things or parts.”); Compose, Random House Dictionary of the 
English Language 302 (unabridged ed. 1973) (“to make or form by 
combining things, parts or elements”). 
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Congress should also exercise its power to render the Supreme 
Court more responsive to democratic realities and to check abusive uses 
of judicial review.263 Few would dispute that judicial review protects 
individual rights when the Court exercises judicial review on behalf of 
minorities to prevent a tyranny of the majority.264 But exercising 
judicial review for the reinstallation of an oligarchy composed of the 
already powerful lacks all legitimacy.265 Protecting monied interests and 
suspect socio-economic hierarchies, as the Court does today with 
unblinking consistency,266 profoundly distorts our democracy.267 The 
fact that only nine justices sit on the Court hailing from just two so-
called “elite” law schools also makes the Court non-reflective of the 
 
263. While judicial independence plays a crucial role in a well-ordered scheme 
of democracy, the judiciary can overstep its bounds, and throughout our 
history the government’s more political branches generally adhered to 
extra-constitutional conventions to secure judicial independence or, 
alternatively, to check perceived judicial excesses. See Tara Leigh Grove, 
The Origins (and Fragility) of Judicial Independence, 71 Vand. L. Rev. 
465, 544–45 (2018). 
264. See Fishkin & Forbath, supra note 24, at 673 (quoting United States v. 
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (“The idea of equal 
protection of the laws is central to our modern understanding of the 
Constitution. Today we generally think of equal protection as a 
constitutional provision aimed against laws that injure groups defined by 
race and sex and other ‘discrete and insular minorities.’”).  
265. See Aaron Tang, Rethinking Political Power in Judicial Review, 106 Cal. 
L. Rev. 1755, 1767–68 (2018); id. at 1825 (arguing “that legislative 
enactments burdening politically powerful groups hold a special kind of 
democratic and institutional pedigree that courts should take into 
account”). 
266. The Roberts Court holds a long record of empowering the powerful to the 
point of nearly re-imposing an oligarchy through judicial fiat. See Janus 
v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. and Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2486 (2018) 
(holding that labor unions may not collect fees to support political 
activities); McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 572 U.S. 185, 226 
(2014) (lifting aggregate limits on campaign contributions); Shelby Cty. 
v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 556–57 (2013) (holding pre-clearance provisions 
of Voting Rights Act unconstitutional); Citizens United v. Fed. Election 
Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 372 (2010) (allowing unlimited corporate 
electioneering); see also Jedediah Purdy, The Roberts Court Protects the 
Powerful for a New Gilded Age, N.Y. Times (June 28, 2018), https:// 
 www.nytimes.com/2018/06/28/opinion/sunday/supreme-court-kennedy-
roberts.html [https://perma.cc/X49G-3B44] (“When it comes to economic 
inequality, today’s Supreme Court is not only failing to help but is also 
aggressively making itself part of the problem in a time when inequality 
and insecurity are damaging the country and endangering our democracy.”). 
267. See Fishkin & Forbath, supra note 24, at 696 (advocating for strict 
scrutiny against laws fostering an oligarchy and a strong presumption of 
constitutionality for laws breaking-down oligarchy).  
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nation and insensitive to the nation’s intellectual diversity.268 This kind 
of concentrated hyper-elitism finds fertile ground for the re-imposition 
of an oligarchy under the guise of a “meritocracy.” Over the years, the 
Court has ranged in size from five justices to ten.269 In the early decades 
of the Republic, the number of justices increased as the nation expan–
ded.270 It has remained fixed at nine since 1869.271 Meanwhile, our 
population increased ten-fold.272 Congress can and should insist on a 
larger, more diverse Court. Expanding the Court makes sense as a 
means of assuring that the vast diversity of the nation is adequately 
 
268. Margaret Talev, Does Supreme Court’s Harvard-Yale Dominance Bother 
Obama?, McClatchy (Apr. 12, 2010, 5:27 PM), https://www.mcclatchydc 
 .com/news/politics-government/article24579943.html [https://perma.cc/ 
 UB9N-2KWE] (noting that George Washington University Professor 
Jonathan Turley calls Harvard and Yale’s dominance on the Court 
“perfectly absurd” and “remarkably inbred”); see also Jason Iuliano & 
Avery Stewart, The New Diversity Crisis in the Federal Judiciary, 84 
Tenn. L. Rev. 247, 299 (“Drawing upon the Federal Judicial Center 
Biographical Database, we found that the educational diversity of federal 
judges is at an all-time low. Over the past century, a smaller and smaller 
number of law schools have claimed a larger and larger share of judgeships 
and clerkships.”). 
269. Peter G. Fish, Justices, Number of, The Oxford Companion to the 
Supreme Court of the United States 550, 550 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 
2d ed. 2005). 
270. Id. 
271. The Judiciary Act of 1869 established the current nine-member Supreme 
Court. Judiciary Act of 1869, ch. 22, 16 Stat. 44. Prior to that Act, 
Congress regularly tinkered with the size of the Court. See Judiciary Act 
of 1789, ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. 73, 73 (establishing that the Court “consist of 
a chief justice and five associate justices”); Seventh Circuit Act of 1807, 
ch. 16, § 5, 2 Stat. 420, 421 (increasing the number from six to seven); 
Tenth Circuit Act of 1863, ch. 100, § 1, 12 Stat. 794, 794 (setting the size 
of the Court at one Chief Justice and nine Associate Justices). In 1866, 
Congress decreased the number of justices. Judicial Circuits Act of 1866, 
ch. 210, § 1, 14 Stat. 209, 209 (“[N]o vacancy in the office of associate 
justice of the [S]upreme [C]ourt shall be filled by appointment until the 
number of associate justices shall be reduced to six.”). 
272. See History: POP Culture: 1870, U.S. Census Bureau, https://www 
 .census.gov/history/www/through_the_decades/fast_facts/1870_fast_f
acts.html [https://perma.cc/RF79-N85Y] (last revised Oct. 21, 2019) 
(noting that the 1870 U.S. Census reported 38,558,371 U.S. residents); see 
also Census Bureau Projects U.S. and World Populations on New Year’s 
Day, U.S. Census Bureau (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.census.gov/ 
 newsroom/press-releases/2019/new-years-population.html [https://perma.cc/ 
 ZPR4-T4KS] (“As our nation prepares to ring in the new year, the U.S. 
Census Bureau projects the U.S. population will be 328,231,337 on Jan. 
1, 2019.”).  
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represented on the Court.273 Such an expansion need not raise the 
specter of a power-grab, like that which the GOP pulled off to achieve 
minority rule.274 
Perhaps the most ambitious of the current proposals to help reverse 
engineer the damage being done to our democracy is the “For the 
People Act of 2019”275 (also known as “HR 1”) which recently passed 
the House of Representatives.276 Sponsored by Representative Sarbanes 
of Maryland, the Act’s goal is “to expand American’s access to the 
ballot box, reduce the influence of big money in politics, and [to] streng–
then ethics rules for public servants and for other purposes.”277 The 
legislation passed the House in a party-line vote.278 Senate Majority 
Leader Mitch McConnell stated that he would not even allow the GOP-
controlled Senate to vote on the measure.279 The bill includes many bold 
innovations such as federally funded campaign contributions that give 
 
273. See Frey, supra note 16 (“Minorities will be the source of all of the growth 
in the nation’s youth and working age population, most of the growth in 
its voters, and much of the growth in its consumers and tax base as far 
into the future as we can see.”).  
274. On this point, President Franklin Roosevelt’s plan to expand the Court 
is tainted to some degree: 
Every history of America in the twentieth century recounts the 
familiar chronicle—that in February of 1937, FDR, in response to 
a series of decisions striking down New Deal laws, asked Congress 
for authority to add as many as six Justices to the Supreme Court, 
only to be outwitted by the Court itself when Chief Justice 
Charles Evans Hughes demonstrated that Roosevelt’s claim that 
the Court was not abreast of its docket was spurious; when the 
conservative Justice Willis Van Devanter retired, thereby giving 
the President an opportunity to alter the composition of the 
bench; and when, above all, the Court, in a series of dramatic 
decisions in the spring of 1937, abandoned its restricted 
conception of the scope of the powers of both state and national 
governments. In short, it is said, Roosevelt’s Court-packing plan 
went down to defeat because, in the catchphrase that swept 
Washington that spring, “a switch in time saved nine.” 
 William E. Leuchtenburg, FDR’s Court-Packing Plan: A Second Life, A 
Second Death, 1985 Duke L.J. 673, 673 (1985). 
275. H.R. 1, 116th Cong. (2019).  
276. Id. 
277. Id. 
278. Mike DeBonis & John Wagner, House Democrats Pass H.R. 1, Their 
Answer to Draining the Swamp, Wash. Post (Mar. 8, 2019), https://www 
 .washingtonpost.com/powerpost/house-democrats-prepare-to-pass-hr-
1-their-answer-to-draining-the-swamp/2019/03/08/740f6b48-415b-11e9-
9361-301ffb5bd5e6_story.html?utm_term=.7b3b1257d27a [https://perma 
 .cc/SJA9-JS9B]. 
279. Id. 
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a candidate six dollars for every one dollar they raise from small 
donors.280 On the other hand, it takes a more tepid approach toward 
expanding voting power relative to the proposals above.281 
There are, in fact, many proposals for reforming and restricting our 
democracy through law in ways that enhance the political system’s 
ability to translate political pressure into law.282 Senator Elizabeth 
Warren favors abolishing the Electoral College.283 Others favor 
proportional representation in the Electoral College.284 Another out–
standing proposal would institute an end-run around the Electoral 
College without formally amending the Constitution by having states 
that represent a majority of electoral votes (currently 270) enter into a 
compact to cast all their electoral votes to the winner of the national 
popular vote.285 Many commentators also offer various methods to deal 
with the anti-democratic nature of the U.S. Senate.286 
This Article does not address fully the constitutionality of any of 
the above proposals for expanding democracy. Instead, it introduces a 
compelling constitutional value—democracy and its expansion—as a 
core cultural and historical value worthy of great weight.287 It further 
argues that given our history of expanding democracy, the tendency to 
expand should weigh much more heavily than efforts to impose 
oligarchic rule in judicial decisions.288 The above proposals would be 
 
280. Id. 
281. Id. 
282. Id. 
283. Astead W. Herndon, Elizabeth Warren Calls for Ending Electoral College, 
N.Y. Times (Mar. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/18/us/ 
 politics/elizabeth-warren-town-hall-electoral-college.html [https://perma 
 .cc/TD8X-HDMC]. 
284. Nicholas Riccardi, 2020 Democrats’ New Litmus Test: Abolish Electoral 
College, U.S. News (Mar. 20, 2019), https://www.usnews.com/news/ 
 politics/articles/2019-03-20/2020-democrats-new-litmus-test-abolish-
electoral-college [https://perma.cc/8NJE-UGZP].  
285. National Popular Vote, Nat’l Conf. on State Legislatures (May 31, 
2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/national-
popular-vote.aspx [https://perma.cc/AY3W-4U3K]. 
286. See Orts, supra note 259 (“Today the voting power of a citizen in 
Wyoming, the smallest state in terms of population, is about 67 times 
that of a citizen in the largest state of California, and the disparities 
among the states are only increasing. The situation is untenable.”); id. 
(noting that scholars have suggested breaking up larger states, reforming 
the Senate’s composition, or abolishing the Senate altogether).  
287. Supra Part III. 
288. Michele E. Gilman, A Court for the One Percent: How the Supreme Court 
Contributes to Economic Inequality, 2014 Utah L. Rev. 389, 434 (“As 
this [article] explains, the Supreme Court has directed political outcomes, 
dismantled congressional attempts to rein in corporate political spending, 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 1·2019 
Deracialization and Democracy 
135 
consistent with that value, and they are appropriate means of repairing 
our democracy and protecting our nation from the threat of an 
oligarchy.289 In other words, the constitutionality of efforts to expand 
democracy should also consider the legitimacy and transparency of the 
radical-right’s cause to re-impose oligarchy.290 Constitutional decision-
making does not occur by accident.291 The handiwork of the Roberts 
Court cannot find shelter behind any traditional mode of adjud–
ication.292 The transparent repair and expansion of our democracy in 
response to threat of an oligarchy would be furthered by the above 
proposals. 
In considering the validity of measures intended to restore 
democracy, the intimate relationship between our racial history and 
democracy must also weigh heavily.293 At its birth, our nation 
succumbed to continuing the nation’s racist stain—slavery—rather 
than risk democracy.294 Even after the bloody conflict of the Civil War 
and the promise of the post-Civil War Amendments, white supremacists 
 
and undermined the electoral process for low-income voters. In each of 
these areas, the 1% flourishes, while the 99% becomes increasingly 
disenfranchised.”). 
289. Supra Part II. 
290. E.g., Gene Nichol, Citizens United and the Roberts Court’s War on 
Democracy, 27 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1007, 1016 (2011) (“What increasingly 
emerges from the Roberts Court’s campaign finance decisions, like a 
mountain appearing through the receding mists, is a foundational 
conclusion that the United States Constitution, ultimately, secures a 
power for people of wealth to use their disproportionate economic 
resources to get their way in our politics.”). 
291. See id. at 1009 (“[S]ave us from these . . . judges who ‘just call balls and 
strikes.’ Plenty has been said about this grotesque hypocrisy. . . . My 
favorite fusillade . . . is Senator Arlen Specter’s claim in his farewell 
address that Chief Justice ‘Roberts promised to just call the balls and 
strikes and then moved the bases.’”). 
292. See id. at 1017 (“[The Roberts Court’s] decisions say, at bottom, that 
there is something about our Constitution that means we are flatly 
powerless to deal with the scourge of purchased politics. This cannot be 
so. It is dangerous and demeaning to the world’s strongest democracy to 
suggest that it is.”). 
293. Thus, for example, the constitutional convention eschewed democracy in 
favor of maintaining slavery. See Perea, Echoes, supra note 18, at 1087 
(“Why does the world’s leading democracy rely on an electoral institution 
that overrides the results of democracy? The answer to this question can 
be found in the proslavery provisions of the Constitution.”). 
294. Id. at 1087 (“As described earlier, the ‘three-fifths of all other persons’ 
phrase in the apportionment clause was intended to give additional 
representation in Congress to the slave states. The electoral college also 
was created to protect the political interests of slave owners in presidential 
elections.”). 
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and oligarchists needed racial animus to fuel their ascendancy and 
economic domination in the South.295 Today’s oligarchs continue to use 
race to fuel their political ambitions to consolidate more power in fewer 
hands.296 Racial politics will bedevil our nation until we reckon with our 
racial hierarchy.297 Expanded democracy operates as a condition 
precedent for breaking down our nation’s festering racial hierarchy.298 
Resisting the continuation of racial politics also operates as a condition 
precedent to expanded democracy.299 Consequently, the stakes of 
democracy and deracialization together form a compelling state 
interest. 
Regardless of the perceived conventions or norms at stake, those in 
favor of a democracy over an oligarchy must not impede the vitality of 
their cause by adhering to notions of precedent and constitutionality 
that the radical right clearly rejects in their pursuit of a restored 
oligarchy.300 Justice Roberts and the other conservatives redefined the 
nearly absolute political pliability of the term constitutionality in cases 
like Citizens United and Shelby County.301 They also defined the 
importance of precedent in common-law rulemaking at the Supreme 
Court level.302 Judicial activism in pursuit of oligarchy knows few 
bounds in the Roberts Court era.303 Politicizing the role of the Senate 
in voiding presidential appointment power also redefined the limits of 
legislative power for partisan purposes.304 
 
295. See MacLean, supra note 30, at 21–25 (detailing Virginia’s oligarchy at 
work under Harry Byrd). 
296. Id. at 234. 
297. Haney López, supra note 48, at 211. 
298. Id. at 219–20. 
299. Id. at 218–19. 
300. Supra note 119. 
301. Supra notes 95, 96, 105, 123. 
302. Supra notes 97, 101. 
303. E.g., Stephen E. Gottlieb, Unfit for Democracy: The Roberts 
Court and the Breakdown of American Politics 203 (2016) (finding 
that Roberts Court protects “entrenched political power” and does not 
respect “rights to vote”); Robert Reich, The Most Brazen Invitation to 
Oligarchy in Supreme Court History, Berkeley Blog (Apr. 2, 2014), 
https://blogs.berkeley.edu/2014/04/02/robert-reich-the-most-brazen-
invitation-to-oligarchy-in-supreme-court-history/ [https://perma.cc/LP7C-
LE29] (“Overturning 40 years of national policy and 38 years of judicial 
precedent, the Court’s decision allows federal officeholders to solicit and 
individual donors to pour as much as $3.6 million directly into federal 
campaigns every election cycle—buying unparalleled personal influence in 
Washington . . . .”). 
304. Ron Elving, What Happened with Merrick Garland in 2016 and Why It 
Matters Now, NPR (June 29, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/ 
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On the other hand, our cause is democracy. The vindication of that 
core value in opposition to stealthy efforts for a restored oligarchy 
drives the analysis herein.305 Properly valuing an expanding democracy 
in accordance with U.S. history and cultural traditions opens far more 
opportunities for legally restoring democracy.306 The transparent 
pursuit of democratic expansion under the law should operate to justify 
even heretofore off-limits legal innovations and to tip constitutional 
analysis more favorably toward traditional notions of democracy and 
against the restoration of an oligarchy.307 The threat of an oligarchy, 
the core value of democracy, and the possibility of deracialization 
combine to form a compelling interest of the highest gravity. 
Conclusion 
This Article argues for a representative democracy, cabined in 
accordance with traditional republican and constitutional limitations, 
but free of the archaic protections of slavery and fully reflective of the 
historic bargains of expanded voting rights throughout our history. It 
seeks to light the way for those wishing to challenge the radical right’s 
efforts to transform our democracy into an oligarchy and to use race to 
illegitimately entrench themselves at the apex of our political and 
economic system contrary to any notion of democracy. Aggressively 
pursuing democratic-enhancing legislative action will prove the most 
efficacious method of short-circuiting the right’s success because of the 
strength and history behind the core value of democracy in America. 
The great majority of American voters remain committed to democracy 
and voting rights; they understand the hard-fought gains in democracy 
illustrated throughout our history. This value finds support in deep 
historic and cultural roots. Most recently, the value of democracy 
triumphed in Florida with the success of Amendment 4. It proved the 
bipartisan appeal of democracy in the voting booth. 
 
 06/29/624467256/what-happened-with-merrick-garland-in-2016-and-why-
it-matters-now [https://perma.cc/CAX3-2AJS] (“Senate Majority Leader 
Mitch McConnell declared any appointment by the sitting president to be 
null and void.”). 
305. See MacLean, supra note 30, at 151–53, 234; Mayer, supra note 47, at 
376. 
306. According to Professor MacLean, the pursuit of an oligarchy relies upon 
both stealth and intimidation. MacLean, supra note 30, at 232–33 
(detailing Koch-funded operatives’ secretive surveillance and intimidation 
efforts). 
307. As such, the proposals above operate within the current constitutional 
framework rather than advocating for any amendments, as others suggest. 
E.g., Devan Cole, Democratic Senator Introduces Constitutional Amendment 
to Abolish Electoral College, CNN (Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/ 
 04/02/politics/senate-democrats-electoral-college-constitutional-amendment/ 
 index.html [https://perma.cc/TJW9-J8VD]. 
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Viewed from this perspective, the effort to remedy the manifest 
deficiencies in our democracy—an effort reflected in HR 1—may well 
prove politically expedient as well as morally sound. Indeed, our 
assessment suggests that the opposition to power consolidation should 
relentlessly pursue enhanced democratic voting power wherever 
possible. The opposition to the radical right should expose its anti-
democratic agenda at every opportunity. It should also seek to highlight 
the fundamentally anti-democratic nature of our political system 
manifested in our institutions. The basis of the Electoral College and 
the U.S. Senate in the South’s insatiable need to preserve slavery must 
become a widely understood point of attack. 
This core value of democracy means that novel and innovative 
methods of perfecting our democracy warrant exploration, vetting, and 
pursuit. Nationwide felony re-enfranchisement is an obvious choice for 
cementing the Amendment 4 victory and expanding democracy in an 
under-privileged population. This issue successfully passed in Florida. 
The Electoral College and the U.S. Senate operate in bizarrely irrational 
and antidemocratic ways, and pro-democracy efforts should challenge 
these pro-slavery methods of placating the South. Law must recondition 
the political system in accordance with contemporary realities; it should 
cease indulging the slave-holder’s needs of yesteryear. 
With respect to the Supreme Court, the law governing its comp–
osition is hopelessly tainted by the U.S. Senate and the Electoral 
College, which both operate to determine the Court’s membership. 
History clearly shows, however, that nine justices no longer suffices for 
a country of over 300 million, and no constitutional provision requires 
that membership perpetually stagnate at nine. The number of Supreme 
Court justices has varied over time, and it is past time to again vary 
the number of justices to reflect the nation they represent. Nine cannot 
parade as a magic number any longer.  
With respect to the U.S. Senate, it holds key veto power over the 
composition of the Supreme Court and over legislation. Yet it operates 
in defiance of the one-citizen-one-vote principle. If we take seriously the 
blood spilt for greater voting rights, then the Senate must change. This 
Article articulates an argument for legislation to expand the comp–
osition of the Senate by adding Senators to states with large populations 
based upon the core value of democracy. Alternatively, the Senate could 
expand through the admission of new states. 
Our conclusion suggests that if a wide-ranging and ceaseless attack 
is launched against the now manifest anti-democratic forces dominating 
our government, then democratic pressure for racial reform will succeed. 
This conclusion garners support from the demographic and economic 
realities that surely will challenge the continuation of our racial 
hierarchy. So long as the radical right fails to reimpose the oligarchy 
that marred our nation’s birth, then racial progress should inexorably 
follow the manifest contemporary economic and demographic realities 
of our nation. That racial hierarchy, in fact, forms the source of the 
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political power of the radical right. That summarizes the intimate 
relationship between democracy and deracialization. 
